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what's up this is Sean and this is Jay

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we're going to talk about flying saucers

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[Music]

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flying saucers

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foreign

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what's up Jay how you doing sir I'm

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doing really well how are you doing

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today I'm okay I'm hanging in there uh

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we got in there great guest today uh Mr

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Tom Rogan so I'm super excited about

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that yeah I'm very excited about that as

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well he's going to be joining us in just

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a little bit yeah um so we have a little

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bit of time to catch up with each other

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catch up with the folks in the chat yeah

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time should be here in about a half hour

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so about 25 minutes from now so we can

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start the countdown

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yeah

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if you're in the chat and you don't have

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your popcorn yet or if you're in the UK

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and it's already you know happy hour or

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something like that

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um you know feel free to run off to the

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fridge

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um it's wonderful to see everybody in

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the chat yeah what's up everybody in the

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trip uh Andre's sword water lily Zach

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um Robert good to see you Jos is back

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Sun saver super great to have everybody

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here so

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um

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you know there hasn't been

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too much news

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lightly although you know and I hate to

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do this but I just feel like I gotta

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keep talking about Liberation Time stuff

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because Chris just has such a great job

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covering this stuff so he sure does it

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sure does yeah that is

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and you know if anything it's a good

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it's a good thought to you know

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um so let me I'll share this link in the

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chat but uh basically it's the idea of a

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uh Church committee coming to Congress

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in regards to like UAP so for those that

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weren't familiar the church committee

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was done

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uh many uh decades ago

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and it basically uncovered a lot of the

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like MK Ultra I believe in some some

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like abuses the intelligence agency

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um was

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you know was conducting on people MK

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Ultra was where they were basically

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doping up citizens with acid and all

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that kind of stuff so

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um pretty interesting stuff so the idea

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of this church committee is to you know

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the idea of looking back through the

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intelligence community and other areas

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of the government for things like that

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those are pieces of power illegal things

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whether it be providing misinformation

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on purpose regarding UAP or things of

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that sort so

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um then they added a couple quotes from

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Lou Elizondo in here of course saying

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that t uh would support that so what's

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he gonna say no I don't support that

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right but yeah

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and I think one of the one of the more

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interesting things in here yeah so the

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original Church committee that was back

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in 1975 investigating abuses by U.S

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intelligence agencies and you know and

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Chris points out in his article that

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that's that a new version of that's been

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contemplated by some members of Congress

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since the Whistleblower language was

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published in the intelligence

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authorization Act of actually the the

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version that was originally introduced

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in back in July way back in July and so

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he's pointing out that the new

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Republican speaker of the house uh Kevin

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McCarthy who is narrowly approved at the

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end of last week very narrowly after was

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it 14 or 15 ballots or something like

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that um he's reportedly ready to support

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a committee like that to investigate

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government abuses in general including

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the FBI's relationship with social media

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companies right now that now that comes

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somewhat as no surprise after for those

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that um sit around on Twitter relatively

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frequently or even check in with it

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um you know Elon Musk who now runs

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Twitter has has been kind of retweeting

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and and encouraging

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people to look into

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um newly public documents that seem to

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show that that government agencies

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intelligence agencies have been

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involved or trying to help shape policy

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with social media companies including

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Facebook and Twitter

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right so that's a that's kind of a

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that's kind of the a launch pad for this

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and then fellow house Republican and

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incoming house intelligence committee

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chair Mike Turner who represents

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Wright-Patterson Air Force bases

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district has recently been damning of

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the FBI's resistance to turnover files

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regarding its relationship with social

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media companies and is contemplating the

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use of subpoena power if necessary

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behind the scenes those and this is in

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Chris's article behind the scenes those

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advocating for an effort to identify

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government equities and possibly illegal

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secretive programs relating to UAP would

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call for such a committee to extend and

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uncover further alleged abuses by

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intelligence agencies

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such a trajectory could reflect the

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revelations which have emerged from the

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church committee that started with the

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US Army spying on civilians and led to

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the uncovering of the cia's MK Ultra as

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you said Sean involving the drugging and

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torture of Unknowing U.S citizens as

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part of human experimentation on mind

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control how Wild is that

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right right

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just in torture of unknown U.S citizens

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like who would prove that

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right and this is not yeah you know you

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know and that and nothing again nothing

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about this is this is all in the

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historical record it's all in the

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Congressional Record you can even find

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videotapes of this this is not tin foil

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hat stuff this is this is we're just

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talking about stuff as it happened as as

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we try to as much as humanly possible on

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the show

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um you know the the one thing that I

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think of is uh you know they have this

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language in uh um authorization act

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about uh misinformation

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and looking into any programs or

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anything

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um of the sort where people provided

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misinformation whether it be like news

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outlets or other people probably within

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the government in regards to UAP and I

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think everybody pretty much

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um in the the UAP field are people who

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pay attention to UFOs always feel like

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the government has provided some

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misinformation whether it be the

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Robertson panel from the early 50s or

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you know the content report or just you

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know things like the Air Force going

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directly to Media think that things were

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you know something a pilot's always a

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planet or something of the sort

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um but I think there's also another

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facet to this that could be quite

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interesting as well

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um and and that's in direct relation to

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things like Richard Dottie

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you know completely providing people

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like Paul benowitz misinformation

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according to him at least and

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um other people as he stated before that

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he was you know a part of like five

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cases or something like that where he

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did that and that's misinformation so if

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you're going to go back on the record I

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would assume that that kind of thing

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would come out as well and I hope it

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does because that is such crap and it

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really aggravates me that that happened

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yeah no I agree with you and it's

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interesting because you know the it's

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interesting that you bring up Richard

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Dodie and and Paul benowitz because you

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know that case of misinforming a a

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person to such a strong degree that it

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led to the unraveling of you know their

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mental state and their mental Wellness

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um you know as Greg Bishop wrote in his

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book project beta

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um again this is all a matter of record

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um you know nothing speculative in in

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terms of like the nuts and bolts of this

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case anyway that Richard Doty even

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admits that that's what he was tasked to

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do and and for those that don't know you

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know there's there's a lot to say about

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somebody like right but um but he was

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essential actually tasked with

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investigating this guy Paul benowitz who

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had

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earnestly and innocently gotten in touch

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with an Air Force Base down in New

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Mexico because he thought that there

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were

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um uh UAP over this this secret base

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well not a secret base an air over

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Kirtland Air Force Base and around there

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there's there's another kind of a more

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secretive facility and so he got in

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touch because he thought that there were

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UAP there and he saw even that there was

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secret messaging that he was picking up

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on because he was he's an engineer and

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he had he was a quite the hobbyist and

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even a professional

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um was in that regard and so he he was

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quite good at at detection

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um and observation and RF and things

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like that and so this guy Richard Dodie

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was tasked with kind of following up on

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him and eventually had to kind of like

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weave this weave Paul benowitz away from

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the possibility of there being secret

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Tech at this base yes to basically said

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well I think what you may be seeing is

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the UFO right or extra Choice really you

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know

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this comment Mirage Man by uh Mr Skinny

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Bob that's it's a movie you can watch

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that was made kind of about that so it's

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definitely worth checking out because I

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think this is also kind of a problem in

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the UFO world for sure I mean Dodie's

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still out there he just did a

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documentary where he's talking about uh

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the these two ETS that were recovered

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and we had one for a while called and we

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use their you know technology to talk

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with them and all this stuff which I'm

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sorry sounds like complete more

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like the aliens really enjoyed the

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strawberry ice cream

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he says he said all sorts of things and

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and you know things like that like a

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strawberry ice cream move right I mean

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you have to

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you know there's there's a point where

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you know he has admitted that he has to

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do assessment or like that's what he was

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tasked to do right he was tasked to

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assess how people respond to things and

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so you know what I mean like these

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there's it reminds me of this kind of

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Nigerian prince scams where somebody

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emails you out of the blue and they're

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like quick I'm a Nigerian prince and I

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have millions of dollars I just need to

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like I just need you to forward me 5 000

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right now

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um and then I'll give you you know 11

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000 back or whatever it is and you know

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on the face of it it's ridiculous be you

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know people have done thorough studies

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of these things and there will be like

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intentional typos and stuff like that in

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these emails and it's because they like

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you know they've there have been

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interviews with people that have tried

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to pull off these scams and they say you

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know it's easier you want to make it

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unbelievable or you want to make it at

279
00:12:20,990 --> 00:12:17,220
that point because you don't want to get

280
00:12:23,210 --> 00:12:21,000
too far into to a scam with somebody and

281
00:12:25,069 --> 00:12:23,220
have them pull out you want to you want

282
00:12:27,889 --> 00:12:25,079
to make sure that there's like a big

283
00:12:30,530 --> 00:12:27,899
dumb barrier right at the outset

284
00:12:32,990 --> 00:12:30,540
um and so they're going for it you're

285
00:12:37,250 --> 00:12:33,000
probably good sealed the deal right

286
00:12:38,930 --> 00:12:37,260
right yeah yeah the ice cream bit I'm

287
00:12:40,190 --> 00:12:38,940
gonna go for the ice cream bit right

288
00:12:41,810 --> 00:12:40,200
yeah

289
00:12:45,110 --> 00:12:41,820
Sky's your limit

290
00:12:47,269 --> 00:12:45,120
yeah water lily says that in the chat

291
00:12:49,329 --> 00:12:47,279
that ice cream is a weakness uh for

292
00:12:53,690 --> 00:12:49,339
water will Ellie and well yeah

293
00:12:56,150 --> 00:12:53,700
yeah yeah eb1 that's right but um yeah

294
00:12:57,710 --> 00:12:56,160
it's it's a fascinating thing and you

295
00:13:00,230 --> 00:12:57,720
know there's there's a lot of that

296
00:13:03,050 --> 00:13:00,240
within this I mean another aspect of

297
00:13:04,730 --> 00:13:03,060
that within this community that it

298
00:13:08,690 --> 00:13:04,740
deserves being talked about it's the

299
00:13:13,670 --> 00:13:10,910
um certain pieces of information just to

300
00:13:15,949 --> 00:13:13,680
see where it travels and this is

301
00:13:18,710 --> 00:13:15,959
something that certain people do and has

302
00:13:20,329 --> 00:13:18,720
been noted to happen where you'll hear

303
00:13:22,550 --> 00:13:20,339
about a case all of a sudden that's kind

304
00:13:24,470 --> 00:13:22,560
of buried you know in the archives or

305
00:13:26,930 --> 00:13:24,480
whatever and somebody will say like oh

306
00:13:29,150 --> 00:13:26,940
you know what I heard I heard that yada

307
00:13:31,250 --> 00:13:29,160
yada yada case back in blah blah I heard

308
00:13:32,629 --> 00:13:31,260
that was legit or people will give you a

309
00:13:34,670 --> 00:13:32,639
specific number or something like that

310
00:13:37,129 --> 00:13:34,680
they'll say like I heard that there are

311
00:13:40,069 --> 00:13:37,139
23 whistleblowers that are going to be

312
00:13:42,590 --> 00:13:40,079
coming out this year 23. and then you

313
00:13:45,410 --> 00:13:42,600
know maybe some of those people are

314
00:13:46,970 --> 00:13:45,420
actually tasked you know they send out a

315
00:13:49,190 --> 00:13:46,980
specific number so that then they can

316
00:13:51,470 --> 00:13:49,200
hear who else you know says the number

317
00:13:54,910 --> 00:13:51,480
23 and parrots that later on because

318
00:13:58,970 --> 00:13:54,920
then they can figure out the the traffic

319
00:14:01,310 --> 00:13:58,980
analysis of of where you know where

320
00:14:03,650 --> 00:14:01,320
where leaks are happening or where

321
00:14:05,690 --> 00:14:03,660
information travels you know this is a

322
00:14:09,650 --> 00:14:05,700
very common strategy and people employ

323
00:14:14,389 --> 00:14:09,660
it all the time for I hope you tell me

324
00:14:21,470 --> 00:14:17,569
yeah that's uh it's just it's just too

325
00:14:25,009 --> 00:14:21,480
bad because I mean I've I follow

326
00:14:26,150 --> 00:14:25,019
that guy uh daddy like recently I've

327
00:14:28,310 --> 00:14:26,160
just been

328
00:14:31,610 --> 00:14:28,320
um I've listened back to it to a few

329
00:14:34,430 --> 00:14:31,620
Coast to Coast episodes from like 2000 I

330
00:14:36,610 --> 00:14:34,440
might get the dates wrong but 2006 or

331
00:14:40,189 --> 00:14:36,620
seven or eight or nine or whatever

332
00:14:42,769 --> 00:14:40,199
around that area and

333
00:14:44,400 --> 00:14:42,779
you know you you listen to those with

334
00:14:44,810 --> 00:14:44,410
daddy or there was this other guy

335
00:14:45,769 --> 00:14:44,820
[Music]

336
00:14:51,650 --> 00:14:45,779
um

337
00:14:55,550 --> 00:14:53,210
you know all the things you're talking

338
00:14:57,650 --> 00:14:55,560
about like uh project serpo

339
00:14:59,750 --> 00:14:57,660
which was this thing that came out where

340
00:15:02,269 --> 00:14:59,760
there is this Exchange program between

341
00:15:03,650 --> 00:15:02,279
aliens and astronauts and I'm pretty

342
00:15:05,569 --> 00:15:03,660
sure

343
00:15:07,430 --> 00:15:05,579
I was able to figure out that Dottie was

344
00:15:09,470 --> 00:15:07,440
the source for that

345
00:15:12,170 --> 00:15:09,480
uh what she denies

346
00:15:14,509 --> 00:15:12,180
but he's called Falcon and was part of

347
00:15:16,910 --> 00:15:14,519
like the Aviary or whatever and in one

348
00:15:19,009 --> 00:15:16,920
interview I thought he wasn't on it was

349
00:15:21,170 --> 00:15:19,019
said that Falcon was the anonymous

350
00:15:22,850 --> 00:15:21,180
source for the Surplus stuff so you're

351
00:15:25,790 --> 00:15:22,860
able to put this together because I feel

352
00:15:27,410 --> 00:15:25,800
like some of these people didn't realize

353
00:15:28,060 --> 00:15:27,420
that this media is going to stay around

354
00:15:31,009 --> 00:15:28,070
forever

355
00:15:34,490 --> 00:15:31,019
[Laughter]

356
00:15:36,290 --> 00:15:34,500
interviews and these these other things

357
00:15:38,569 --> 00:15:36,300
that happen are going to be around for a

358
00:15:40,069 --> 00:15:38,579
while and so people can go back and kind

359
00:15:43,129 --> 00:15:40,079
of look at that stuff

360
00:15:44,930 --> 00:15:43,139
so that and then there's like the

361
00:15:46,990 --> 00:15:44,940
Roswell thing all of a sudden became

362
00:15:50,150 --> 00:15:47,000
kind of uh shaky to me because

363
00:15:53,210 --> 00:15:50,160
apparently well I learned that the

364
00:15:55,250 --> 00:15:53,220
reason for Roswell kind of coming back

365
00:15:56,629 --> 00:15:55,260
into the foreground was because of Bill

366
00:16:00,050 --> 00:15:56,639
Moore

367
00:16:01,310 --> 00:16:00,060
really and he wrote the first book on

368
00:16:04,490 --> 00:16:01,320
Roswell

369
00:16:07,069 --> 00:16:04,500
and Bill Moore

370
00:16:09,410 --> 00:16:07,079
Bill Moore was

371
00:16:11,689 --> 00:16:09,420
a guy who was into UFOs went to these

372
00:16:13,430 --> 00:16:11,699
UFO conventions there was this move-on

373
00:16:15,110 --> 00:16:13,440
convention and I forget what the day was

374
00:16:17,569 --> 00:16:15,120
it was a while ago now but he came out

375
00:16:19,670 --> 00:16:17,579
and admitted that he was peddling

376
00:16:21,170 --> 00:16:19,680
misinformation and he was like an

377
00:16:24,650 --> 00:16:21,180
informant

378
00:16:26,269 --> 00:16:24,660
that's right that's right yeah so then

379
00:16:28,490 --> 00:16:26,279
that kind of brings everything into

380
00:16:31,370 --> 00:16:28,500
question if that's the case and this guy

381
00:16:34,009 --> 00:16:31,380
wrote the first book on Roswell like and

382
00:16:37,389 --> 00:16:34,019
he was friends with Dottie those two so

383
00:16:40,370 --> 00:16:37,399
what what is real

384
00:16:41,870 --> 00:16:40,380
right you know and for those and for

385
00:16:44,930 --> 00:16:41,880
those that are interested

386
00:16:46,189 --> 00:16:44,940
um uh in the chat or watching this in

387
00:16:49,129 --> 00:16:46,199
the future

388
00:16:51,230 --> 00:16:49,139
um that case the bill Moore case is also

389
00:16:53,090 --> 00:16:51,240
written about in Project beta Greg

390
00:16:55,490 --> 00:16:53,100
Bishop's really great book on

391
00:16:58,370 --> 00:16:55,500
misinformation and disinformation

392
00:17:00,590 --> 00:16:58,380
um so uh please if you want a thorough

393
00:17:02,150 --> 00:17:00,600
accounting of that uh go to Greg's

394
00:17:03,410 --> 00:17:02,160
really great book it's highly

395
00:17:05,210 --> 00:17:03,420
recommended

396
00:17:08,809 --> 00:17:05,220
um but yeah you're absolutely you're

397
00:17:12,049 --> 00:17:08,819
absolutely 100 right and you know

398
00:17:14,270 --> 00:17:12,059
I mean on the one hand those are those

399
00:17:16,069 --> 00:17:14,280
are a finite amount of cases however

400
00:17:18,890 --> 00:17:16,079
those are the cases that we know about

401
00:17:21,230 --> 00:17:18,900
right right and so how many other people

402
00:17:24,230 --> 00:17:21,240
out there and I think that that's one

403
00:17:27,949 --> 00:17:24,240
thing that that you know is consistently

404
00:17:29,930 --> 00:17:27,959
challenging for so many people within

405
00:17:32,030 --> 00:17:29,940
the community that the more that they

406
00:17:34,490 --> 00:17:32,040
hear the lore and then they find lore

407
00:17:36,650 --> 00:17:34,500
that they like you know what I mean and

408
00:17:40,130 --> 00:17:36,660
people find lore that they like and then

409
00:17:43,130 --> 00:17:40,140
it's hard to and then that kind of like

410
00:17:46,130 --> 00:17:43,140
it it's a tether there's a tether there

411
00:17:47,930 --> 00:17:46,140
and it it it kind of you know anchors

412
00:17:50,630 --> 00:17:47,940
into your brain and then you think you

413
00:17:52,909 --> 00:17:50,640
hear other options you you kind of move

414
00:17:55,669 --> 00:17:52,919
through all these spaces it's easy to

415
00:17:57,289 --> 00:17:55,679
understand why people will go get into

416
00:17:59,330 --> 00:17:57,299
this community walk in the door and be

417
00:18:01,310 --> 00:17:59,340
like oh cool all this weird weird stuff

418
00:18:03,650 --> 00:18:01,320
and there's there's awesome craft and

419
00:18:05,510 --> 00:18:03,660
they go over here and they go wow you

420
00:18:07,610 --> 00:18:05,520
know and there's beings and there's this

421
00:18:09,710 --> 00:18:07,620
and there's bodies and there's crashes

422
00:18:11,330 --> 00:18:09,720
and there's Intrigue and all this stuff

423
00:18:13,970 --> 00:18:11,340
and then after a while they're like oh

424
00:18:16,730 --> 00:18:13,980
my God you know there's all these lies

425
00:18:20,270 --> 00:18:16,740
and there and there's there's almost

426
00:18:22,970 --> 00:18:20,280
always like a process of intrigue and

427
00:18:25,190 --> 00:18:22,980
Fascination and then disillusion and

428
00:18:27,650 --> 00:18:25,200
then kind of rebuilding that happens

429
00:18:30,470 --> 00:18:27,660
with people that that are in this

430
00:18:33,470 --> 00:18:30,480
community for or are interested in this

431
00:18:36,110 --> 00:18:33,480
topic in general for for a while and dig

432
00:18:38,930 --> 00:18:36,120
deep like it's it's almost

433
00:18:40,430 --> 00:18:38,940
it's it's almost unavoidable if you're

434
00:18:42,650 --> 00:18:40,440
really thinking critically and looking

435
00:18:44,870 --> 00:18:42,660
at it at an analytic level and I think

436
00:18:46,850 --> 00:18:44,880
that that's one thing that that people

437
00:18:48,710 --> 00:18:46,860
sometimes don't appreciate from the

438
00:18:51,529 --> 00:18:48,720
skeptical side of things because a lot

439
00:18:55,130 --> 00:18:51,539
of the people in the skeptical side of

440
00:18:58,250 --> 00:18:55,140
the UFO UAP commit Community don't

441
00:19:01,010 --> 00:18:58,260
appreciate that those that are really in

442
00:19:03,409 --> 00:19:01,020
it like also have gone through their

443
00:19:05,330 --> 00:19:03,419
period of disillusionment and just went

444
00:19:07,450 --> 00:19:05,340
through a rebuilding process you know

445
00:19:10,850 --> 00:19:07,460
what I mean like a lot of the Skeptics

446
00:19:12,770 --> 00:19:10,860
assume that there was never a period of

447
00:19:14,150 --> 00:19:12,780
disillusionment which could that you

448
00:19:16,130 --> 00:19:14,160
know that couldn't be further than the

449
00:19:18,770 --> 00:19:16,140
truth for most people if you actually

450
00:19:21,350 --> 00:19:18,780
talk to them sure yeah I mean I know

451
00:19:23,450 --> 00:19:21,360
just for myself like because you read

452
00:19:27,289 --> 00:19:23,460
like the official Air Force cases so

453
00:19:30,529 --> 00:19:27,299
like and I and I've had my own thing so

454
00:19:32,450 --> 00:19:30,539
I know there's something you know and so

455
00:19:34,730 --> 00:19:32,460
you want to go look for more and you go

456
00:19:37,370 --> 00:19:34,740
in these other directions and everyone

457
00:19:39,650 --> 00:19:37,380
is offering more trust me there's so

458
00:19:41,930 --> 00:19:39,660
many people that offer you more on what

459
00:19:44,690 --> 00:19:41,940
they think UAP is or whatever there's so

460
00:19:47,330 --> 00:19:44,700
many different directions to go and you

461
00:19:49,789 --> 00:19:47,340
know you go down one and you know you

462
00:19:51,310 --> 00:19:49,799
realize it's just

463
00:19:53,450 --> 00:19:51,320
there's a trap

464
00:19:56,630 --> 00:19:53,460
you know and there's and there's nothing

465
00:19:58,190 --> 00:19:56,640
there or for whatever reason there's

466
00:20:00,049 --> 00:19:58,200
this or that you know and it can get

467
00:20:02,150 --> 00:20:00,059
quite frustrating so you get kind of

468
00:20:04,909 --> 00:20:02,160
like well I'm over this I'm done with it

469
00:20:07,370 --> 00:20:04,919
you know but in the end you know that

470
00:20:10,669 --> 00:20:07,380
there's something in there

471
00:20:11,690 --> 00:20:10,679
yeah and that's that's kind of you know

472
00:20:14,810 --> 00:20:11,700
my

473
00:20:16,669 --> 00:20:14,820
the ground I stand on you know I I know

474
00:20:18,470 --> 00:20:16,679
that there's there's something there but

475
00:20:20,870 --> 00:20:18,480
it's it's just unfortunate that people

476
00:20:24,350 --> 00:20:20,880
kind of try to throw so much trash and

477
00:20:26,270 --> 00:20:24,360
garbage in the area to kind of

478
00:20:28,850 --> 00:20:26,280
just muck it up to make it almost

479
00:20:32,930 --> 00:20:28,860
impossible to find something you know

480
00:20:35,570 --> 00:20:32,940
real so yeah and but I mean you can it

481
00:20:38,150 --> 00:20:35,580
just take it just takes time you know it

482
00:20:39,610 --> 00:20:38,160
does it does and I think I mean I think

483
00:20:43,190 --> 00:20:39,620
one of the issues

484
00:20:45,650 --> 00:20:43,200
right you have to be like just because

485
00:20:47,750 --> 00:20:45,660
you believe that UFOs are real or

486
00:20:49,669 --> 00:20:47,760
there's something there doesn't mean

487
00:20:51,470 --> 00:20:49,679
that you're not also a skeptic you know

488
00:20:53,990 --> 00:20:51,480
kind of going on what you were saying

489
00:20:57,590 --> 00:20:54,000
like we still have to play this game of

490
00:20:59,870 --> 00:20:57,600
who's full of crap and who isn't yeah or

491
00:21:01,370 --> 00:20:59,880
or I mean I think that you know like

492
00:21:02,750 --> 00:21:01,380
people like Mitch Horowitz have been

493
00:21:05,870 --> 00:21:02,760
have said lately and things like that

494
00:21:09,909 --> 00:21:05,880
that there's that I think a problem with

495
00:21:12,830 --> 00:21:09,919
the term skeptic has been that that

496
00:21:16,010 --> 00:21:12,840
unfortunately a lot of people that act

497
00:21:18,890 --> 00:21:16,020
in bad faith in our community adopt the

498
00:21:21,049 --> 00:21:18,900
term skeptic when in fact they just want

499
00:21:23,390 --> 00:21:21,059
to throw out barriers they're not honest

500
00:21:25,610 --> 00:21:23,400
Skeptics they're actually bad faith

501
00:21:27,289 --> 00:21:25,620
Skeptics and there's a difference and we

502
00:21:29,690 --> 00:21:27,299
and we have to really think about it

503
00:21:31,370 --> 00:21:29,700
they're yeah yeah you get trolls you get

504
00:21:34,370 --> 00:21:31,380
bullies and people say well I'm just

505
00:21:36,169 --> 00:21:34,380
skeptical I'm skeptical or I I just want

506
00:21:38,029 --> 00:21:36,179
to see the evidence and and then they

507
00:21:41,450 --> 00:21:38,039
throw up strawman or whatever but like

508
00:21:44,210 --> 00:21:41,460
beyond that I I you know there's also

509
00:21:47,570 --> 00:21:44,220
the issue of you know open-mindedness

510
00:21:49,789 --> 00:21:47,580
versus skepticism and I think or you

511
00:21:53,570 --> 00:21:49,799
know looking at things with a critical

512
00:21:55,909 --> 00:21:53,580
eye and and that you know I don't

513
00:21:59,029 --> 00:21:55,919
personally think of myself as a skeptic

514
00:22:01,310 --> 00:21:59,039
about the UAP topic but I do think about

515
00:22:04,190 --> 00:22:01,320
my myself as a skeptic of certain

516
00:22:07,490 --> 00:22:04,200
figures within you volunteers exactly or

517
00:22:10,990 --> 00:22:07,500
theories or ideas of it you know so

518
00:22:14,450 --> 00:22:11,000
you're you're a skeptic Within

519
00:22:15,710 --> 00:22:14,460
belief basically right you know like it

520
00:22:17,570 --> 00:22:15,720
doesn't mean that you just believe

521
00:22:19,190 --> 00:22:17,580
everything you know you know you're

522
00:22:21,289 --> 00:22:19,200
still skeptical of all the different

523
00:22:23,330 --> 00:22:21,299
things and and you know whether it be

524
00:22:25,010 --> 00:22:23,340
books or ideas people try to sell you or

525
00:22:28,430 --> 00:22:25,020
whether it's Dodie or Stephen Grier

526
00:22:31,130 --> 00:22:28,440
you're still skeptical of that you know

527
00:22:32,810 --> 00:22:31,140
right and you still have and in in many

528
00:22:34,490 --> 00:22:32,820
ways it's more difficult

529
00:22:35,870 --> 00:22:34,500
because you're not making this simple

530
00:22:38,149 --> 00:22:35,880
choice of

531
00:22:42,710 --> 00:22:38,159
is it real or not

532
00:22:44,570 --> 00:22:42,720
you know right yes it's real but now

533
00:22:46,850 --> 00:22:44,580
the universe

534
00:22:49,970 --> 00:22:46,860
ex that Universe expands because now

535
00:22:52,130 --> 00:22:49,980
it's like what is it you know and

536
00:22:54,169 --> 00:22:52,140
everybody has their different idea of of

537
00:22:57,110 --> 00:22:54,179
what it is and

538
00:23:00,950 --> 00:22:57,120
you know and it can be expensive you

539
00:23:03,230 --> 00:23:00,960
know you've got books time right all

540
00:23:05,930 --> 00:23:03,240
sorts well there's there yeah it's

541
00:23:08,149 --> 00:23:05,940
expensive and it's expansive it expands

542
00:23:10,370 --> 00:23:08,159
like like no matter where you go into

543
00:23:13,070 --> 00:23:10,380
this field it's going to it's going to

544
00:23:15,230 --> 00:23:13,080
radiate into so many other areas and so

545
00:23:16,430 --> 00:23:15,240
you know that that can be another point

546
00:23:17,750 --> 00:23:16,440
where people throw out their hands and

547
00:23:20,690 --> 00:23:17,760
at the same time you know the people

548
00:23:22,930 --> 00:23:20,700
that really Thrive you know in being

549
00:23:25,970 --> 00:23:22,940
invested in this topic are the people

550
00:23:28,970 --> 00:23:25,980
that will could look at a topic maybe

551
00:23:30,289 --> 00:23:28,980
like like um materialism and

552
00:23:32,630 --> 00:23:30,299
Consciousness and things like that and

553
00:23:34,730 --> 00:23:32,640
be like oh maybe space time isn't

554
00:23:36,529 --> 00:23:34,740
fundamental you know what I mean or you

555
00:23:38,990 --> 00:23:36,539
know or maybe physicality isn't

556
00:23:41,390 --> 00:23:39,000
fundamental and there's some truth that

557
00:23:44,390 --> 00:23:41,400
you can hang on to yeah yeah and then

558
00:23:46,610 --> 00:23:44,400
and then you know if if you can if you

559
00:23:49,970 --> 00:23:46,620
can kind of stand on those Sandy Shores

560
00:23:53,090 --> 00:23:49,980
of of topics like that and and and kind

561
00:23:55,730 --> 00:23:53,100
of be you know and and that that really

562
00:23:57,950 --> 00:23:55,740
inspires you to think harder you know

563
00:24:00,049 --> 00:23:57,960
what I mean and if that inspires you and

564
00:24:02,149 --> 00:24:00,059
and makes you excited you know what I

565
00:24:04,130 --> 00:24:02,159
mean if that Thrills you then you know

566
00:24:06,830 --> 00:24:04,140
that's a good you know that's a good

567
00:24:08,810 --> 00:24:06,840
indicator that that you could be in this

568
00:24:10,190 --> 00:24:08,820
community for quite a long time you know

569
00:24:11,870 --> 00:24:10,200
what I mean or you could be interested

570
00:24:13,789 --> 00:24:11,880
in these topics for quite a long time

571
00:24:15,890 --> 00:24:13,799
anyway we've talked about this before

572
00:24:18,470 --> 00:24:15,900
too but it's it's

573
00:24:21,409 --> 00:24:18,480
um like the the search for you know

574
00:24:22,130 --> 00:24:21,419
whatever meaning or whatever it could be

575
00:24:24,950 --> 00:24:22,140
um

576
00:24:29,149 --> 00:24:24,960
in the midst of of doing that you learn

577
00:24:31,250 --> 00:24:29,159
about so many other types of things you

578
00:24:32,230 --> 00:24:31,260
know that you would never think you

579
00:24:34,430 --> 00:24:32,240
would

580
00:24:36,350 --> 00:24:34,440
learn about and you don't even think

581
00:24:37,789 --> 00:24:36,360
about it you're just like all of a

582
00:24:41,029 --> 00:24:37,799
sudden I know about like classic

583
00:24:43,490 --> 00:24:41,039
airplanes and stuff you know like

584
00:24:46,730 --> 00:24:43,500
in in the kind of radar systems they

585
00:24:49,549 --> 00:24:46,740
used in the 50s you know like why would

586
00:24:51,409 --> 00:24:49,559
I ever know that you know right yeah so

587
00:24:52,909 --> 00:24:51,419
like I'm I'm somewhat familiar with

588
00:24:55,430 --> 00:24:52,919
those and you know all the different

589
00:24:57,289 --> 00:24:55,440
things Radars can pick up and stuff and

590
00:24:58,970 --> 00:24:57,299
it's not because I had an interest in

591
00:25:01,669 --> 00:24:58,980
that it was because I had an interest in

592
00:25:03,950 --> 00:25:01,679
UFOs I wanted to go look at the cases

593
00:25:05,870 --> 00:25:03,960
and when you look at the cases and

594
00:25:07,789 --> 00:25:05,880
there's a radar visual case you know

595
00:25:11,630 --> 00:25:07,799
you're like well what kind of radar is

596
00:25:13,430 --> 00:25:11,640
that you know is it possible to have

597
00:25:16,789 --> 00:25:13,440
anomalous propagation or what's the deal

598
00:25:19,010 --> 00:25:16,799
so now you got to research the radar

599
00:25:20,510 --> 00:25:19,020
and by the end of it you're like I have

600
00:25:23,690 --> 00:25:20,520
all this information that's kind of

601
00:25:25,610 --> 00:25:23,700
useless but no it's great and it takes

602
00:25:27,289 --> 00:25:25,620
all kinds right it's important to have

603
00:25:29,630 --> 00:25:27,299
all these different pieces of the puzzle

604
00:25:32,330 --> 00:25:29,640
because you know as we've said before

605
00:25:34,250 --> 00:25:32,340
you you are a little bit more

606
00:25:36,110 --> 00:25:34,260
skeptically minded or kind of a little

607
00:25:38,630 --> 00:25:36,120
bit more conservative and in your

608
00:25:41,630 --> 00:25:38,640
thinking in terms of this topic than I

609
00:25:43,310 --> 00:25:41,640
am and partially just because you know

610
00:25:44,750 --> 00:25:43,320
the the circles that I'm in partially

611
00:25:48,289 --> 00:25:44,760
because of my own personal experiences

612
00:25:50,330 --> 00:25:48,299
and things like that I I'm I'm a little

613
00:25:52,610 --> 00:25:50,340
I'm more at the deep end of the swimming

614
00:25:55,250 --> 00:25:52,620
pool let's put it that way right and at

615
00:25:57,470 --> 00:25:55,260
the same time you know like I

616
00:25:59,870 --> 00:25:57,480
you know people in the deep end of the

617
00:26:01,310 --> 00:25:59,880
swimming pool still need to still every

618
00:26:03,230 --> 00:26:01,320
once in a while you need to touch the

619
00:26:04,669 --> 00:26:03,240
bottom any or you need to get to the

620
00:26:07,850 --> 00:26:04,679
side of the pool right it's important

621
00:26:09,710 --> 00:26:07,860
it's incredibly important and so and and

622
00:26:13,070 --> 00:26:09,720
it's I think that one of the reasons why

623
00:26:15,529 --> 00:26:13,080
those like folks like me appreciate you

624
00:26:17,810 --> 00:26:15,539
know can appreciate you know the more

625
00:26:20,210 --> 00:26:17,820
grounded the much more grounded side of

626
00:26:22,850 --> 00:26:20,220
things is that it's absolutely it's it's

627
00:26:25,190 --> 00:26:22,860
necessary for the conversation overall

628
00:26:26,510 --> 00:26:25,200
out in the public consensus out in the

629
00:26:28,669 --> 00:26:26,520
public realm you know we're going to be

630
00:26:31,310 --> 00:26:28,679
talking to Tom in a few minutes here and

631
00:26:34,570 --> 00:26:31,320
you know it's it's really it's there's

632
00:26:37,130 --> 00:26:34,580
there are people these days that are

633
00:26:39,350 --> 00:26:37,140
that are you know really bent on trying

634
00:26:41,990 --> 00:26:39,360
to figure out a way to communicate this

635
00:26:43,850 --> 00:26:42,000
to a much much larger audience in a way

636
00:26:46,190 --> 00:26:43,860
that makes sense and it's and it can be

637
00:26:48,110 --> 00:26:46,200
challenging because you know there are

638
00:26:50,870 --> 00:26:48,120
there are people that just want it to be

639
00:26:52,490 --> 00:26:50,880
you know spaceships you know from other

640
00:26:54,169 --> 00:26:52,500
planets and then there are people like

641
00:26:56,149 --> 00:26:54,179
Jacque Valley

642
00:26:58,070 --> 00:26:56,159
um you know who who say that if it's

643
00:26:59,870 --> 00:26:58,080
only you know beings coming here from

644
00:27:02,210 --> 00:26:59,880
other planets he's going to appointed

645
00:27:04,250 --> 00:27:02,220
you know what I mean and it just it's

646
00:27:05,750 --> 00:27:04,260
way too easy yeah that's right and it

647
00:27:08,390 --> 00:27:05,760
goes and it goes further and further

648
00:27:11,810 --> 00:27:08,400
from there right yeah so well speaking

649
00:27:13,430 --> 00:27:11,820
of Mr Tom Rogan I just saw him pop up in

650
00:27:15,890 --> 00:27:13,440
the green room

651
00:27:19,490 --> 00:27:15,900
um do you have an introduction for uh

652
00:27:22,010 --> 00:27:19,500
sure yeah I sure do here let me pick it

653
00:27:24,350 --> 00:27:22,020
up here all right

654
00:27:26,029 --> 00:27:24,360
Tom Rogan is an online editor and

655
00:27:28,610 --> 00:27:26,039
foreign policy writer for the Washington

656
00:27:30,110 --> 00:27:28,620
examiner he writes frequently on

657
00:27:32,090 --> 00:27:30,120
security and intelligence issues

658
00:27:34,549 --> 00:27:32,100
involving Russia China and the Middle

659
00:27:36,710 --> 00:27:34,559
East he holds a Bachelor of Arts in war

660
00:27:37,909 --> 00:27:36,720
studies from King's College London a

661
00:27:41,630 --> 00:27:37,919
master of science in Middle East

662
00:27:43,669 --> 00:27:41,640
politics from soas and a graduate

663
00:27:45,890 --> 00:27:43,679
diploma in law from the University of

664
00:27:47,149 --> 00:27:45,900
law of London among others he has

665
00:27:49,970 --> 00:27:47,159
previously written for the Wall Street

666
00:27:52,310 --> 00:27:49,980
Journal The Washington Post Reuters the

667
00:27:54,830 --> 00:27:52,320
independent the Atlantic National Review

668
00:27:56,810 --> 00:27:54,840
the Telegraph and the guardian welcome

669
00:28:02,110 --> 00:27:56,820
Tom thanks good to be with you guys

670
00:28:06,409 --> 00:28:04,789
I had a one of those lights that you put

671
00:28:09,110 --> 00:28:06,419
next to you to make you but apparently

672
00:28:12,230 --> 00:28:09,120
one I think someone has moved it so I'm

673
00:28:14,810 --> 00:28:12,240
using my cell phone light I don't like

674
00:28:17,230 --> 00:28:14,820
this or like that it's either which way

675
00:28:19,370 --> 00:28:17,240
you look great both ways

676
00:28:22,190 --> 00:28:19,380
as long as I'm not screwing up your

677
00:28:24,230 --> 00:28:22,200
production oh no you look fantastic no

678
00:28:26,330 --> 00:28:24,240
you're not you know what thanks thanks

679
00:28:28,430 --> 00:28:26,340
for having me on yeah thanks thanks for

680
00:28:29,870 --> 00:28:28,440
being out I really appreciate it

681
00:28:31,970 --> 00:28:29,880
um you know we were just talking before

682
00:28:33,830 --> 00:28:31,980
you got on like the the little boogers

683
00:28:36,950 --> 00:28:33,840
in the UFO community that kind of spread

684
00:28:38,870 --> 00:28:36,960
like misinformation and such and you

685
00:28:40,789 --> 00:28:38,880
know in kind of making sure I was

686
00:28:43,430 --> 00:28:40,799
abreast of everything that you've done I

687
00:28:46,510 --> 00:28:43,440
came across uh an article you wrote

688
00:28:50,330 --> 00:28:46,520
about Stephen Greer yeah

689
00:28:52,430 --> 00:28:50,340
about the flare thing and is that where

690
00:28:54,590 --> 00:28:52,440
this story started where he you know

691
00:28:55,970 --> 00:28:54,600
flares out of a helicopter during a

692
00:28:58,549 --> 00:28:55,980
retreat can you tell me a little bit

693
00:29:00,890 --> 00:28:58,559
about that yeah so you know I had

694
00:29:03,590 --> 00:29:00,900
someone flag that for me and basically

695
00:29:06,890 --> 00:29:03,600
went through the FAA you know the you

696
00:29:08,269 --> 00:29:06,900
know the data uh and it learned strongly

697
00:29:10,730 --> 00:29:08,279
like

698
00:29:12,289 --> 00:29:10,740
um you know flares at least in this case

699
00:29:13,250 --> 00:29:12,299
were dropped out of a plane off the

700
00:29:15,649 --> 00:29:13,260
coast

701
00:29:17,269 --> 00:29:15,659
um you know paid to do that and the the

702
00:29:19,850 --> 00:29:17,279
you know managed to track down the the

703
00:29:21,950 --> 00:29:19,860
company that uh owned the plane and they

704
00:29:24,110 --> 00:29:21,960
suddenly went very quiet and didn't want

705
00:29:26,690 --> 00:29:24,120
to talk about it and you know I think

706
00:29:28,310 --> 00:29:26,700
one of the things you know I'm very

707
00:29:29,870 --> 00:29:28,320
confident in this case you know flesh

708
00:29:32,389 --> 00:29:29,880
were involved and when you look at the

709
00:29:34,669 --> 00:29:32,399
imagery you know but

710
00:29:37,250 --> 00:29:34,679
other people seem to have you know

711
00:29:39,710 --> 00:29:37,260
different views on Greer I mean I I we

712
00:29:42,350 --> 00:29:39,720
thought he's a little bit out there and

713
00:29:44,450 --> 00:29:42,360
you know but perhaps in a different vein

714
00:29:47,750 --> 00:29:44,460
to to the subject matter that I'm

715
00:29:49,789 --> 00:29:47,760
interested in but what I think motivated

716
00:29:53,570 --> 00:29:49,799
me particularly to write that piece was

717
00:29:55,250 --> 00:29:53,580
the concern that if you truly do believe

718
00:29:57,169 --> 00:29:55,260
um as he would purport to believe that

719
00:30:00,470 --> 00:29:57,179
he is you know doing something

720
00:30:02,510 --> 00:30:00,480
extraordinary why would you you

721
00:30:05,750 --> 00:30:02,520
jeopardize all that

722
00:30:08,630 --> 00:30:05,760
um with this kind of uh Antics and you

723
00:30:10,190 --> 00:30:08,640
know and it plays very I think the

724
00:30:12,769 --> 00:30:10,200
frustration for me probably for for

725
00:30:15,169 --> 00:30:12,779
other people is that when people engage

726
00:30:16,850 --> 00:30:15,179
in things like that it dilutes not

727
00:30:18,409 --> 00:30:16,860
simply their own credibility but the

728
00:30:20,930 --> 00:30:18,419
broader credibility of the entire field

729
00:30:21,830 --> 00:30:20,940
and in journalism you know that that's

730
00:30:23,690 --> 00:30:21,840
it

731
00:30:24,950 --> 00:30:23,700
I think we have to kind of cover stories

732
00:30:27,409 --> 00:30:24,960
like that because you know it's

733
00:30:31,070 --> 00:30:27,419
legitimate and it's quite frankly you

734
00:30:33,590 --> 00:30:31,080
know not terribly honest but it also is

735
00:30:34,909 --> 00:30:33,600
frustrating because you know as I'm sure

736
00:30:37,610 --> 00:30:34,919
you agree there's a lot going on here

737
00:30:40,310 --> 00:30:37,620
that is extraordinary and when you know

738
00:30:42,470 --> 00:30:40,320
when it's diluted in any way it it harms

739
00:30:45,409 --> 00:30:42,480
the entire Enterprise

740
00:30:47,570 --> 00:30:45,419
absolutely I mean it it really it's it's

741
00:30:51,049 --> 00:30:47,580
a shame because it really

742
00:30:52,909 --> 00:30:51,059
it it really clouds and muddies the

743
00:30:55,070 --> 00:30:52,919
waters because when you look back at say

744
00:30:57,230 --> 00:30:55,080
what he did with like the the national

745
00:30:59,090 --> 00:30:57,240
Press Club hearings in 2001 or something

746
00:31:00,950 --> 00:30:59,100
like that there it did seem like that

747
00:31:02,870 --> 00:31:00,960
there was a real that there was a there

748
00:31:04,430 --> 00:31:02,880
there you know what I mean that there he

749
00:31:06,110 --> 00:31:04,440
had he was able to bring in a lot of

750
00:31:08,149 --> 00:31:06,120
people on the record

751
00:31:09,710 --> 00:31:08,159
um that were from the FAA or from the

752
00:31:13,070 --> 00:31:09,720
military and things like that and that

753
00:31:14,450 --> 00:31:13,080
was and it seemed you know like looking

754
00:31:16,070 --> 00:31:14,460
back on that that was kind of a

755
00:31:19,430 --> 00:31:16,080
historical moment within the community

756
00:31:21,230 --> 00:31:19,440
in a larger way and you know and the

757
00:31:24,049 --> 00:31:21,240
timing was terrible obviously and things

758
00:31:26,690 --> 00:31:24,059
like that and it's a shame that

759
00:31:28,970 --> 00:31:26,700
the the situation that

760
00:31:30,470 --> 00:31:28,980
the guy's just gone so far of course I

761
00:31:33,110 --> 00:31:30,480
mean to be perfectly Frank from my

762
00:31:36,169 --> 00:31:33,120
perspective but yeah but but as you say

763
00:31:38,990 --> 00:31:36,179
you know that he did you know give him

764
00:31:41,810 --> 00:31:39,000
um his duties for those early events

765
00:31:43,310 --> 00:31:41,820
yeah right um so to talk about some of

766
00:31:45,830 --> 00:31:43,320
your latest work actually and we talked

767
00:31:49,310 --> 00:31:45,840
about this on the show last week um it

768
00:31:51,470 --> 00:31:49,320
was your uh recent piece about some

769
00:31:54,529 --> 00:31:51,480
unidentified sightings over Lawrence

770
00:31:56,990 --> 00:31:54,539
Livermore laboratory where that giant

771
00:31:58,730 --> 00:31:57,000
Fusion uh experiment was was just

772
00:32:00,289 --> 00:31:58,740
unveiled not too long ago where that's

773
00:32:02,389 --> 00:32:00,299
where that happened

774
00:32:04,850 --> 00:32:02,399
um in reading through you know your

775
00:32:09,169 --> 00:32:04,860
piece on it it seems kind of like some

776
00:32:11,510 --> 00:32:09,179
may have been drones maybe one was

777
00:32:13,730 --> 00:32:11,520
um you know not obviously a drone it was

778
00:32:15,950 --> 00:32:13,740
kind of like a silver circular

779
00:32:18,289 --> 00:32:15,960
sphere-ish kind of thing but it was

780
00:32:20,810 --> 00:32:18,299
quite high and and hard to kind of tell

781
00:32:22,850 --> 00:32:20,820
what it was can you maybe just run

782
00:32:24,350 --> 00:32:22,860
through that piece a little bit for some

783
00:32:25,909 --> 00:32:24,360
what your thoughts are and if you think

784
00:32:27,289 --> 00:32:25,919
things are really drones or are they

785
00:32:28,909 --> 00:32:27,299
just using these words because they

786
00:32:31,430 --> 00:32:28,919
don't know what else to say you know

787
00:32:33,950 --> 00:32:31,440
that sort of thing well yeah I mean I I

788
00:32:35,570 --> 00:32:33,960
did um you know Freedom of Information

789
00:32:37,130 --> 00:32:35,580
Act requests

790
00:32:39,110 --> 00:32:37,140
um you know I have some others

791
00:32:41,330 --> 00:32:39,120
outstanding but I think you know high

792
00:32:44,269 --> 00:32:41,340
technology or uh cutting-ed research

793
00:32:47,029 --> 00:32:44,279
military or scientific sites uh

794
00:32:49,490 --> 00:32:47,039
certainly nuclear uh sites

795
00:32:51,049 --> 00:32:49,500
um you know obviously do have a

796
00:32:53,930 --> 00:32:51,059
connection Point

797
00:32:55,310 --> 00:32:53,940
um or I I it is it's my uh understanding

798
00:32:57,830 --> 00:32:55,320
that they have a connection point with

799
00:32:59,810 --> 00:32:57,840
you know the broader let's see more

800
00:33:01,070 --> 00:32:59,820
extraordinary elements of this issue of

801
00:33:02,029 --> 00:33:01,080
the phenomenon whatever you want to call

802
00:33:04,310 --> 00:33:02,039
it

803
00:33:06,230 --> 00:33:04,320
um so did those requests the returns I

804
00:33:08,990 --> 00:33:06,240
got back were the you know ones I I

805
00:33:11,990 --> 00:33:09,000
wrote about there and I think

806
00:33:15,409 --> 00:33:12,000
um you know the the the top lines are

807
00:33:17,210 --> 00:33:15,419
that that clearly in in these cases you

808
00:33:19,730 --> 00:33:17,220
know the security

809
00:33:21,529 --> 00:33:19,740
um offices there and you know the

810
00:33:23,990 --> 00:33:21,539
management were not able to get to the

811
00:33:25,970 --> 00:33:24,000
bottom of what was going on uh at least

812
00:33:27,289 --> 00:33:25,980
in the first instance

813
00:33:29,090 --> 00:33:27,299
um and I have no reason to believe

814
00:33:31,310 --> 00:33:29,100
they've got to the bottom of what was

815
00:33:33,470 --> 00:33:31,320
going on further down the road and stuff

816
00:33:34,430 --> 00:33:33,480
that wouldn't have to be available for

817
00:33:36,590 --> 00:33:34,440
it

818
00:33:39,289 --> 00:33:36,600
um and you know whether that's

819
00:33:40,669 --> 00:33:39,299
um you know someone you know because of

820
00:33:43,310 --> 00:33:40,679
the location of some of these places

821
00:33:44,990 --> 00:33:43,320
it's it's hard to think you know that it

822
00:33:46,310 --> 00:33:45,000
is just some random person and the

823
00:33:48,710 --> 00:33:46,320
timing

824
00:33:50,810 --> 00:33:48,720
um you know it could be

825
00:33:52,370 --> 00:33:50,820
um but certainly there would be a

826
00:33:54,590 --> 00:33:52,380
foreign intelligence concern that you

827
00:33:56,870 --> 00:33:54,600
know the FBI would take seriously again

828
00:33:59,090 --> 00:33:56,880
I don't know whether the FBI did for

829
00:34:01,669 --> 00:33:59,100
other investigation I do know that they

830
00:34:04,610 --> 00:34:01,679
do investigate intrusions at nuclear

831
00:34:06,889 --> 00:34:04,620
sites where there's reports sometimes

832
00:34:08,869 --> 00:34:06,899
um and local field offices take that on

833
00:34:10,129 --> 00:34:08,879
for obvious reasons that you want to

834
00:34:12,530 --> 00:34:10,139
know if someone's messing around with

835
00:34:14,990 --> 00:34:12,540
nuclear facilities

836
00:34:16,790 --> 00:34:15,000
um but you know I did think it was

837
00:34:20,450 --> 00:34:16,800
striking the description of that one

838
00:34:22,369 --> 00:34:20,460
silver circular uh object and you know

839
00:34:25,849 --> 00:34:22,379
the way that it had been described to be

840
00:34:28,730 --> 00:34:25,859
loitering and hard to characterize and

841
00:34:29,629 --> 00:34:28,740
there certainly is an impetus to in the

842
00:34:32,210 --> 00:34:29,639
government

843
00:34:35,629 --> 00:34:32,220
um to identify things as drones as far

844
00:34:37,490 --> 00:34:35,639
as is possible to try and avoid you know

845
00:34:41,510 --> 00:34:37,500
dealing with you know more difficult

846
00:34:42,050 --> 00:34:41,520
questions but you know as as you know

847
00:34:44,030 --> 00:34:42,060
um

848
00:34:46,310 --> 00:34:44,040
I think it's Adam Kehoe you know to this

849
00:34:48,889 --> 00:34:46,320
piece of the drive on on drones off the

850
00:34:50,750 --> 00:34:48,899
West Coast there is a concern with you

851
00:34:53,089 --> 00:34:50,760
know very capable foreign State actors

852
00:34:55,010 --> 00:34:53,099
the Chinese I think in that case

853
00:34:57,349 --> 00:34:55,020
um operating drones in quite clever

854
00:35:01,790 --> 00:34:57,359
Boutique ways as intelligence collection

855
00:35:04,250 --> 00:35:01,800
platforms and so you know we do need to

856
00:35:05,930 --> 00:35:04,260
um you know be careful but but what I

857
00:35:08,030 --> 00:35:05,940
would say is

858
00:35:09,710 --> 00:35:08,040
um you can have both things going on at

859
00:35:11,870 --> 00:35:09,720
the same time right the problem is the

860
00:35:13,430 --> 00:35:11,880
problem no matter what it is yeah

861
00:35:15,530 --> 00:35:13,440
yeah and you should want to exactly

862
00:35:17,750 --> 00:35:15,540
figure out uh what it is and and I do

863
00:35:18,890 --> 00:35:17,760
think that's the fortunate thing on this

864
00:35:20,150 --> 00:35:18,900
subject

865
00:35:21,770 --> 00:35:20,160
um is

866
00:35:24,829 --> 00:35:21,780
certainly what's driving members of

867
00:35:25,849 --> 00:35:24,839
Congress uh to a degree

868
00:35:28,010 --> 00:35:25,859
um you know there are other degrees

869
00:35:29,510 --> 00:35:28,020
which are driving them you know on the

870
00:35:31,130 --> 00:35:29,520
the more extraordinary stuff but they

871
00:35:33,770 --> 00:35:31,140
want to know you know what is this

872
00:35:35,630 --> 00:35:33,780
that's going on uh and I think you know

873
00:35:37,490 --> 00:35:35,640
at least a significant number of people

874
00:35:39,230 --> 00:35:37,500
in the military you know law enforcement

875
00:35:42,050 --> 00:35:39,240
intelligence Community want to know as

876
00:35:44,270 --> 00:35:42,060
well what you know what is the nature of

877
00:35:47,569 --> 00:35:44,280
these intrusions what prospective threat

878
00:35:50,270 --> 00:35:47,579
does it pose yeah what is your general

879
00:35:53,450 --> 00:35:50,280
feeling from you know any any sources

880
00:35:55,849 --> 00:35:53,460
you may have as far as is this more of a

881
00:35:57,950 --> 00:35:55,859
drone issue or is this a UAP issue and

882
00:36:00,470 --> 00:35:57,960
what I mean by that is

883
00:36:02,810 --> 00:36:00,480
um it doesn't seem to be just a drone

884
00:36:06,349 --> 00:36:02,820
issue or they would be for threat with

885
00:36:08,210 --> 00:36:06,359
the language you know yeah for ndaa and

886
00:36:09,290 --> 00:36:08,220
everything but what's your take what you

887
00:36:10,130 --> 00:36:09,300
know what are you feeling what are you

888
00:36:13,510 --> 00:36:10,140
hearing

889
00:36:15,890 --> 00:36:13,520
well I mean I I think you know there are

890
00:36:17,390 --> 00:36:15,900
both is happening

891
00:36:19,730 --> 00:36:17,400
um I think it's certainly some of the

892
00:36:20,870 --> 00:36:19,740
military cases there is a

893
00:36:22,370 --> 00:36:20,880
um you know there is a foreign

894
00:36:25,810 --> 00:36:22,380
adversarial element with the Chinese

895
00:36:29,450 --> 00:36:25,820
using civilian platforms to mask pla

896
00:36:32,450 --> 00:36:29,460
military operations but there's also uh

897
00:36:35,390 --> 00:36:32,460
I'm extremely confident uh you know a

898
00:36:38,569 --> 00:36:35,400
non drone or a really unconventional UAP

899
00:36:40,910 --> 00:36:38,579
style activity that's that's bearing

900
00:36:43,970 --> 00:36:40,920
um into those you know the carrier

901
00:36:46,790 --> 00:36:43,980
strike groups some of those operations

902
00:36:49,310 --> 00:36:46,800
um sensitive military test flights the

903
00:36:50,990 --> 00:36:49,320
space domain underwater because the

904
00:36:53,990 --> 00:36:51,000
performance characteristics that the

905
00:36:56,510 --> 00:36:54,000
sensors and in you know cases that you

906
00:36:58,370 --> 00:36:56,520
know Pilots also seeing things they do

907
00:37:01,069 --> 00:36:58,380
not conform to any known you know

908
00:37:03,589 --> 00:37:01,079
vehicles or the intelligence communities

909
00:37:05,630 --> 00:37:03,599
understanding of of what foreign

910
00:37:07,730 --> 00:37:05,640
adversarial uh you know again China

911
00:37:11,030 --> 00:37:07,740
Russia for example having development

912
00:37:13,069 --> 00:37:11,040
right that they they are so far beyond

913
00:37:15,470 --> 00:37:13,079
um and

914
00:37:17,870 --> 00:37:15,480
um it's also you know I I think a point

915
00:37:19,670 --> 00:37:17,880
of note that that you know

916
00:37:22,310 --> 00:37:19,680
if you have

917
00:37:24,470 --> 00:37:22,320
um Russian and Chinese air Crews

918
00:37:26,390 --> 00:37:24,480
military air Crews talking about seeing

919
00:37:29,990 --> 00:37:26,400
things that they don't understand

920
00:37:31,910 --> 00:37:30,000
and you know if we know that you know if

921
00:37:34,730 --> 00:37:31,920
we've detected them talking about those

922
00:37:39,230 --> 00:37:34,740
things then you know there's a pretty

923
00:37:41,390 --> 00:37:39,240
good Baseline to think okay well it's

924
00:37:43,430 --> 00:37:41,400
it's some of this is is you know it's a

925
00:37:45,650 --> 00:37:43,440
it's a global issue and it's not just

926
00:37:47,210 --> 00:37:45,660
them doing it right um you know you do

927
00:37:48,710 --> 00:37:47,220
have red teaming right where you test

928
00:37:50,750 --> 00:37:48,720
your own technology against your own

929
00:37:52,490 --> 00:37:50,760
people but certainly in the case of the

930
00:37:55,490 --> 00:37:52,500
US there are very strict protocols to be

931
00:37:58,970 --> 00:37:55,500
doing that for reasons of flight safety

932
00:38:01,130 --> 00:37:58,980
um and it's interesting and they're off

933
00:38:04,390 --> 00:38:01,140
like safety concerns that that bear down

934
00:38:07,430 --> 00:38:04,400
heavily on this and I think you know

935
00:38:08,870 --> 00:38:07,440
the best way to kill off a career you

936
00:38:11,270 --> 00:38:08,880
know you might think is to talk about

937
00:38:13,490 --> 00:38:11,280
the issue because of the stigma but the

938
00:38:15,530 --> 00:38:13,500
very best way to kill off a career is to

939
00:38:17,569 --> 00:38:15,540
push it aside and then have an impact at

940
00:38:19,430 --> 00:38:17,579
some point where an air crew die and you

941
00:38:21,290 --> 00:38:19,440
know subjects to one person and two

942
00:38:23,329 --> 00:38:21,300
person some of the intelligence

943
00:38:25,130 --> 00:38:23,339
platforms we fly you're getting over you

944
00:38:27,050 --> 00:38:25,140
know 10 people

945
00:38:28,849 --> 00:38:27,060
um so that's going to be you know

946
00:38:30,410 --> 00:38:28,859
submarine cruise for example if

947
00:38:32,089 --> 00:38:30,420
something is coming in very fast against

948
00:38:34,910 --> 00:38:32,099
the submarine instead of essentially

949
00:38:36,470 --> 00:38:34,920
waving and then bugging off what if it

950
00:38:38,450 --> 00:38:36,480
doesn't wave off

951
00:38:40,730 --> 00:38:38,460
um you know so so there's a safety

952
00:38:42,890 --> 00:38:40,740
element that drives the the

953
00:38:45,109 --> 00:38:42,900
extraordinary element here which to me

954
00:38:47,510 --> 00:38:45,119
and also that Congress has its teeth in

955
00:38:49,670 --> 00:38:47,520
it it's not going away now

956
00:38:52,550 --> 00:38:49,680
um even if there is you know an active

957
00:38:55,430 --> 00:38:52,560
effort to try and slow roll

958
00:38:57,770 --> 00:38:55,440
um and you know defray everything as you

959
00:39:00,950 --> 00:38:57,780
know conventional in explanation or

960
00:39:03,710 --> 00:39:00,960
sensor anomaly or Pilot you know took

961
00:39:04,690 --> 00:39:03,720
too many you know stay awake drugs

962
00:39:06,950 --> 00:39:04,700
um

963
00:39:08,930 --> 00:39:06,960
yeah the sensor anomaly thing is

964
00:39:10,370 --> 00:39:08,940
incredible to me considering how they've

965
00:39:12,829 --> 00:39:10,380
blamed sightings on anomalous

966
00:39:14,630 --> 00:39:12,839
propagation since the late 40s you know

967
00:39:17,210 --> 00:39:14,640
it's like well at this point you think

968
00:39:19,250 --> 00:39:17,220
you would have that worked out yeah and

969
00:39:21,050 --> 00:39:19,260
but but look look let's be clear I mean

970
00:39:22,550 --> 00:39:21,060
sensor anomalies do happen you know if

971
00:39:24,230 --> 00:39:22,560
it's configured for something in a

972
00:39:26,810 --> 00:39:24,240
certain way uh you know some of this

973
00:39:29,510 --> 00:39:26,820
will be sensor anomalies but not all of

974
00:39:31,849 --> 00:39:29,520
it is and to say I I mean that's where I

975
00:39:33,950 --> 00:39:31,859
think you're right is just to blur it

976
00:39:36,530 --> 00:39:33,960
off is everything is a weather balloon

977
00:39:38,270 --> 00:39:36,540
um it's just

978
00:39:40,790 --> 00:39:38,280
what we need you know we have a big

979
00:39:43,130 --> 00:39:40,800
problem then with sensors and secondly

980
00:39:45,170 --> 00:39:43,140
and training of our Pilots exactly

981
00:39:47,870 --> 00:39:45,180
exactly we have a big problem with with

982
00:39:50,690 --> 00:39:47,880
uh you know pilots and their eyeballs uh

983
00:39:52,670 --> 00:39:50,700
and sonar operators and space uh

984
00:39:55,670 --> 00:39:52,680
apparatus controllers so you know it's

985
00:39:58,250 --> 00:39:55,680
it's pretty that's to me is why I think

986
00:40:00,530 --> 00:39:58,260
you know it's it's I I get frustrated

987
00:40:02,030 --> 00:40:00,540
sometimes when you know because if you

988
00:40:03,710 --> 00:40:02,040
talk to the people who are doing this

989
00:40:05,710 --> 00:40:03,720
stuff in the conventional space right

990
00:40:08,210 --> 00:40:05,720
what they're trained to do you know

991
00:40:09,950 --> 00:40:08,220
incredibly highly trained to intercept

992
00:40:12,349 --> 00:40:09,960
with you know

993
00:40:15,530 --> 00:40:12,359
intelligently controlled Chinese or

994
00:40:17,329 --> 00:40:15,540
Russian Pilots or submarines as the

995
00:40:19,670 --> 00:40:17,339
level of professionalism and training

996
00:40:21,530 --> 00:40:19,680
and you know submariners for example to

997
00:40:23,390 --> 00:40:21,540
get their Dolphins the amount of effort

998
00:40:24,890 --> 00:40:23,400
you know years of training for Pilots to

999
00:40:26,770 --> 00:40:24,900
you know studying every waking hour

1000
00:40:29,569 --> 00:40:26,780
essentially when they're not on on Watch

1001
00:40:32,690 --> 00:40:29,579
and you know these aren't idiots or

1002
00:40:34,609 --> 00:40:32,700
people who just decided you know oh in

1003
00:40:35,930 --> 00:40:34,619
six months I'm you know it's not like

1004
00:40:37,250 --> 00:40:35,940
they've just gone through basic training

1005
00:40:40,370 --> 00:40:37,260
right these are people who are

1006
00:40:43,370 --> 00:40:40,380
incredibly technically skilled

1007
00:40:47,150 --> 00:40:43,380
um you know at their jobs yeah

1008
00:40:48,650 --> 00:40:47,160
now yeah and along along these lines in

1009
00:40:50,750 --> 00:40:48,660
terms of what you're saying in terms of

1010
00:40:54,109 --> 00:40:50,760
Congress sinking their teeth into it and

1011
00:40:56,930 --> 00:40:54,119
everything else what in looking at the

1012
00:41:01,190 --> 00:40:56,940
NDA legislation that was recently passed

1013
00:41:04,970 --> 00:41:01,200
and and the the quite large section on

1014
00:41:05,569 --> 00:41:04,980
UAP issues that is in there

1015
00:41:08,630 --> 00:41:05,579
um

1016
00:41:10,670 --> 00:41:08,640
what did you find that is the most

1017
00:41:12,650 --> 00:41:10,680
exciting to you or you think has the

1018
00:41:15,650 --> 00:41:12,660
most potential within that NDA

1019
00:41:18,410 --> 00:41:15,660
legislation and is there anything about

1020
00:41:20,390 --> 00:41:18,420
that NDA legislation that gives you

1021
00:41:23,150 --> 00:41:20,400
pause or makes you think that something

1022
00:41:24,589 --> 00:41:23,160
might be kept from the public that

1023
00:41:27,410 --> 00:41:24,599
really should come out

1024
00:41:29,510 --> 00:41:27,420
well one of the things that is very

1025
00:41:31,490 --> 00:41:29,520
frustrating and I think

1026
00:41:33,589 --> 00:41:31,500
uh quite frankly patently absurd in

1027
00:41:34,910 --> 00:41:33,599
terms of the over classification and

1028
00:41:36,410 --> 00:41:34,920
there's a you know there is an agreement

1029
00:41:38,210 --> 00:41:36,420
I think with a lot of people like

1030
00:41:41,450 --> 00:41:38,220
Director of National Intelligence Harold

1031
00:41:43,130 --> 00:41:41,460
Haynes is you know I know is a very

1032
00:41:45,710 --> 00:41:43,140
um Keen that this is the

1033
00:41:49,069 --> 00:41:45,720
overclassification issue is a problem

1034
00:41:51,050 --> 00:41:49,079
um it slows down uh action it can annoy

1035
00:41:53,150 --> 00:41:51,060
allies sometimes and a lot of it is

1036
00:41:55,430 --> 00:41:53,160
unnecessary

1037
00:41:57,770 --> 00:41:55,440
um some of it is extremely necessary but

1038
00:42:00,109 --> 00:41:57,780
but the overclassification in terms of

1039
00:42:01,910 --> 00:42:00,119
uh let's talk about if we talk about UAP

1040
00:42:04,130 --> 00:42:01,920
imagery

1041
00:42:07,190 --> 00:42:04,140
um that is still classified that has

1042
00:42:09,170 --> 00:42:07,200
been moved to a more restrictive

1043
00:42:11,990 --> 00:42:09,180
um access points right where you know

1044
00:42:14,210 --> 00:42:12,000
again I know for a fact a few years ago

1045
00:42:15,950 --> 00:42:14,220
you you could essentially access that

1046
00:42:17,569 --> 00:42:15,960
with a relatively low it wasn't

1047
00:42:19,550 --> 00:42:17,579
compartmented it wasn't in its own

1048
00:42:20,870 --> 00:42:19,560
keyboard and people would go and look at

1049
00:42:22,790 --> 00:42:20,880
it because it was they thought it was

1050
00:42:24,290 --> 00:42:22,800
cool and weird right you know if you had

1051
00:42:26,690 --> 00:42:24,300
the intelligence clearance this is hey

1052
00:42:28,730 --> 00:42:26,700
look what the hell is this thing

1053
00:42:31,490 --> 00:42:28,740
um now that that has been moved to

1054
00:42:34,250 --> 00:42:31,500
restricted portfolio it's been kept away

1055
00:42:36,849 --> 00:42:34,260
because they don't want it to leak and

1056
00:42:39,349 --> 00:42:36,859
there aren't ways to to

1057
00:42:41,990 --> 00:42:39,359
provide imagery

1058
00:42:43,849 --> 00:42:42,000
um that can you know

1059
00:42:46,370 --> 00:42:43,859
protect National Security right that you

1060
00:42:48,410 --> 00:42:46,380
can redact uh either the data points

1061
00:42:50,210 --> 00:42:48,420
that they're shown there

1062
00:42:51,829 --> 00:42:50,220
um you know foreign you know the

1063
00:42:54,230 --> 00:42:51,839
trainings because of their own

1064
00:42:56,450 --> 00:42:54,240
capabilities are going to assume that we

1065
00:42:58,550 --> 00:42:56,460
have high definition cameras which we do

1066
00:43:00,109 --> 00:42:58,560
you know you what where you don't want

1067
00:43:01,309 --> 00:43:00,119
to release stuff right is is sensor

1068
00:43:04,910 --> 00:43:01,319
imagery

1069
00:43:06,530 --> 00:43:04,920
um but if you can release you know some

1070
00:43:08,390 --> 00:43:06,540
of the test imagery that we've released

1071
00:43:11,089 --> 00:43:08,400
I mean they showed off the new B21

1072
00:43:13,490 --> 00:43:11,099
Raider they do a lot of stuff A lot of

1073
00:43:15,710 --> 00:43:13,500
times whereas a choice has been made

1074
00:43:18,589 --> 00:43:15,720
that the benefits accrued of releasing

1075
00:43:20,750 --> 00:43:18,599
something outweigh the costs in terms of

1076
00:43:22,250 --> 00:43:20,760
the classification impulse and I'm sorry

1077
00:43:24,950 --> 00:43:22,260
if they're releasing that stuff they can

1078
00:43:26,150 --> 00:43:24,960
release you know more imagery that sell

1079
00:43:27,950 --> 00:43:26,160
but they don't want to because they

1080
00:43:31,069 --> 00:43:27,960
don't know how to explain it and it

1081
00:43:32,270 --> 00:43:31,079
opens it kind of works yeah that's what

1082
00:43:34,010 --> 00:43:32,280
I was kind of thinking I was going to

1083
00:43:36,170 --> 00:43:34,020
ask you well I don't why don't they

1084
00:43:37,730 --> 00:43:36,180
release it and it's pretty much what

1085
00:43:40,069 --> 00:43:37,740
you're saying is because they don't know

1086
00:43:41,569 --> 00:43:40,079
what it is yeah and their best excuse

1087
00:43:42,890 --> 00:43:41,579
for you know not wanting to talk about

1088
00:43:44,450 --> 00:43:42,900
this is that that they have other

1089
00:43:46,250 --> 00:43:44,460
Mission requirements right Office of

1090
00:43:47,809 --> 00:43:46,260
Naval intelligence for example which of

1091
00:43:49,730 --> 00:43:47,819
course is a key driver on this wants to

1092
00:43:51,829 --> 00:43:49,740
be focused on

1093
00:43:53,150 --> 00:43:51,839
um you know the Chinese because we're

1094
00:43:55,010 --> 00:43:53,160
probably going to go to war with China

1095
00:43:55,910 --> 00:43:55,020
in the next few years or at least Taiwan

1096
00:43:57,349 --> 00:43:55,920
will

1097
00:43:59,030 --> 00:43:57,359
um and that you know I get that right

1098
00:44:01,130 --> 00:43:59,040
analysts want to focus on that they

1099
00:44:03,109 --> 00:44:01,140
don't want to do this because

1100
00:44:04,790 --> 00:44:03,119
what can they get out of it in terms of

1101
00:44:08,210 --> 00:44:04,800
the immediate National Security value

1102
00:44:10,550 --> 00:44:08,220
versus studying Chinese capabilities but

1103
00:44:11,990 --> 00:44:10,560
the problem becomes

1104
00:44:13,309 --> 00:44:12,000
um I think for them and this is the

1105
00:44:17,150 --> 00:44:13,319
benefit to your question in terms of

1106
00:44:18,470 --> 00:44:17,160
Congress that that there are uh you know

1107
00:44:20,450 --> 00:44:18,480
I would say at a scientific and

1108
00:44:24,290 --> 00:44:20,460
philosophical level deep questions that

1109
00:44:26,089 --> 00:44:24,300
you know Congress once you know to push

1110
00:44:27,530 --> 00:44:26,099
um the government on

1111
00:44:30,470 --> 00:44:27,540
um but they're also profound obviously

1112
00:44:33,109 --> 00:44:30,480
national security questions and and

1113
00:44:35,329 --> 00:44:33,119
you know I think the some of the things

1114
00:44:37,790 --> 00:44:35,339
that really are a particular value there

1115
00:44:40,190 --> 00:44:37,800
you know breaching the kind of

1116
00:44:41,990 --> 00:44:40,200
um third rail as it were of uh the

1117
00:44:43,910 --> 00:44:42,000
undersea domain getting into that

1118
00:44:45,890 --> 00:44:43,920
because a lot of that is

1119
00:44:47,390 --> 00:44:45,900
in some areas very legitimately

1120
00:44:48,589 --> 00:44:47,400
classified

1121
00:44:51,109 --> 00:44:48,599
um space

1122
00:44:54,530 --> 00:44:51,119
um the contract inside that have things

1123
00:44:57,290 --> 00:44:54,540
been pushed to contractors to evade

1124
00:44:59,569 --> 00:44:57,300
um reporting requirements you know at a

1125
00:45:01,550 --> 00:44:59,579
minimum that's that is not con I think

1126
00:45:04,069 --> 00:45:01,560
compatible with American the American

1127
00:45:05,329 --> 00:45:04,079
tradition of governance uh that that you

1128
00:45:07,130 --> 00:45:05,339
could hide things and I think things

1129
00:45:09,710 --> 00:45:07,140
have been hidden

1130
00:45:13,010 --> 00:45:09,720
um and I also think that

1131
00:45:14,630 --> 00:45:13,020
um you know again just the broad uh

1132
00:45:16,250 --> 00:45:14,640
desire of

1133
00:45:17,990 --> 00:45:16,260
um Congress to to you know again

1134
00:45:20,809 --> 00:45:18,000
Congress has its teeth in it we are a

1135
00:45:23,270 --> 00:45:20,819
democracy that that's that's it's not

1136
00:45:25,550 --> 00:45:23,280
going away now even if people might want

1137
00:45:26,930 --> 00:45:25,560
it to for various reasons and you know

1138
00:45:29,150 --> 00:45:26,940
it's just one example Mike Gallagher

1139
00:45:30,829 --> 00:45:29,160
right who's the you know head up

1140
00:45:32,990 --> 00:45:30,839
um the China Select Committee in the new

1141
00:45:35,390 --> 00:45:33,000
House of Representatives you know is big

1142
00:45:37,130 --> 00:45:35,400
on this issue is is you know

1143
00:45:39,170 --> 00:45:37,140
well you know he's going to have the

1144
00:45:40,730 --> 00:45:39,180
opportunity to ask

1145
00:45:43,910 --> 00:45:40,740
um okay what are the Chinese working on

1146
00:45:45,470 --> 00:45:43,920
and certainly even if you the the most

1147
00:45:47,270 --> 00:45:45,480
stupid argument I think for trying to

1148
00:45:49,490 --> 00:45:47,280
put this back in a box and say it's all

1149
00:45:52,670 --> 00:45:49,500
you know silly people and confusion is

1150
00:45:55,069 --> 00:45:52,680
well if something is going on here uh

1151
00:45:57,170 --> 00:45:55,079
and the Chinese are working very hard to

1152
00:45:59,630 --> 00:45:57,180
understand it which South China Morning

1153
00:46:02,089 --> 00:45:59,640
Post is which has very good links to the

1154
00:46:04,490 --> 00:46:02,099
Chinese military is reported on uh the

1155
00:46:06,589 --> 00:46:04,500
PLA and AI trying to understand this if

1156
00:46:09,770 --> 00:46:06,599
they figure it out before we do right we

1157
00:46:11,230 --> 00:46:09,780
have a big you know enter expletive of

1158
00:46:14,450 --> 00:46:11,240
choice problem

1159
00:46:15,890 --> 00:46:14,460
and so and so you know enough people in

1160
00:46:17,690 --> 00:46:15,900
the National Security apparatus and

1161
00:46:18,550 --> 00:46:17,700
Congress understand that

1162
00:46:21,950 --> 00:46:18,560
um

1163
00:46:23,870 --> 00:46:21,960
you know so that you know I just I think

1164
00:46:26,569 --> 00:46:23,880
it's it's a very it's a revolutionary

1165
00:46:28,910 --> 00:46:26,579
time in the in in the subject area even

1166
00:46:31,250 --> 00:46:28,920
if a lot of it is behind the scenes and

1167
00:46:32,630 --> 00:46:31,260
you know but in Washington it frequently

1168
00:46:35,390 --> 00:46:32,640
comes up it's just one of those things

1169
00:46:37,130 --> 00:46:35,400
that it's you know don't talk about this

1170
00:46:39,589 --> 00:46:37,140
is the kind of watchword of the day in

1171
00:46:41,030 --> 00:46:39,599
the government because I guess you know

1172
00:46:42,230 --> 00:46:41,040
ultimately the bureaucracy doesn't know

1173
00:46:43,190 --> 00:46:42,240
how to deal with them bureaucracies

1174
00:46:45,650 --> 00:46:43,200
exist

1175
00:46:47,630 --> 00:46:45,660
yeah make things simple for themselves

1176
00:46:50,329 --> 00:46:47,640
yeah a couple things I thought of there

1177
00:46:53,329 --> 00:46:50,339
the first the first of which is if um

1178
00:46:55,010 --> 00:46:53,339
you know the UAP issue kind of gets the

1179
00:46:58,010 --> 00:46:55,020
push to the side a little bit for more

1180
00:46:59,930 --> 00:46:58,020
pressing issues like uh China or Russia

1181
00:47:03,950 --> 00:46:59,940
and and what they're up to well it kind

1182
00:47:06,050 --> 00:47:03,960
of you know then says that well UAP you

1183
00:47:07,910 --> 00:47:06,060
know they're not theirs

1184
00:47:10,069 --> 00:47:07,920
or that would be a part of that equation

1185
00:47:13,730 --> 00:47:10,079
right oh absolutely no I think I think

1186
00:47:15,770 --> 00:47:13,740
that's you know it's it's it's exactly

1187
00:47:19,069 --> 00:47:15,780
um and the other one is rather than a

1188
00:47:21,170 --> 00:47:19,079
space race maybe we're in a UAP race

1189
00:47:22,730 --> 00:47:21,180
right no I think it's cool I mean we are

1190
00:47:24,650 --> 00:47:22,740
obviously I mean the Russians have

1191
00:47:27,530 --> 00:47:24,660
always been doing this it's part and

1192
00:47:29,510 --> 00:47:27,540
parcel with how they that the Russian

1193
00:47:30,890 --> 00:47:29,520
intelligence modus operandi operates

1194
00:47:31,430 --> 00:47:30,900
that they love

1195
00:47:32,770 --> 00:47:31,440
um

1196
00:47:36,170 --> 00:47:32,780
you know

1197
00:47:38,329 --> 00:47:36,180
unconventional uh means of action and

1198
00:47:40,130 --> 00:47:38,339
and you know pushing the boat because

1199
00:47:42,349 --> 00:47:40,140
you know something like this if you can

1200
00:47:44,870 --> 00:47:42,359
figure it out would allow you

1201
00:47:47,510 --> 00:47:44,880
frankly with relatively little bang for

1202
00:47:48,710 --> 00:47:47,520
the buck massive strategic over match in

1203
00:47:52,010 --> 00:47:48,720
a short window if you could really

1204
00:47:54,410 --> 00:47:52,020
understand the underlying uh physics

1205
00:47:55,910 --> 00:47:54,420
that you know I would say that that you

1206
00:47:57,470 --> 00:47:55,920
know certainly Congress I mean the

1207
00:47:59,569 --> 00:47:57,480
reporting now as well that you know

1208
00:48:00,950 --> 00:47:59,579
breakthrough technology is being talked

1209
00:48:04,370 --> 00:48:00,960
about an official government you know

1210
00:48:06,710 --> 00:48:04,380
that this is the the they know

1211
00:48:08,990 --> 00:48:06,720
and also if this is the Chinese and

1212
00:48:10,430 --> 00:48:09,000
Russians what the hell are they doing I

1213
00:48:12,470 --> 00:48:10,440
mean Vladimir Putin's government

1214
00:48:15,309 --> 00:48:12,480
Vladimir Putin's government is

1215
00:48:17,569 --> 00:48:15,319
fundamentally I would say you know

1216
00:48:19,130 --> 00:48:17,579
threatened in terms of his Prestige

1217
00:48:20,630 --> 00:48:19,140
potentially if the ukrainians when they

1218
00:48:22,790 --> 00:48:20,640
make their push to Crimea his very

1219
00:48:25,010 --> 00:48:22,800
position in power or why isn't he

1220
00:48:26,930 --> 00:48:25,020
deploying these capabilities the same

1221
00:48:29,390 --> 00:48:26,940
point of the Chinese facing a

1222
00:48:32,270 --> 00:48:29,400
fundamental Xi Jinping it's a matter of

1223
00:48:34,430 --> 00:48:32,280
Destiny and political identity that he's

1224
00:48:35,990 --> 00:48:34,440
able to take Taiwan why isn't he

1225
00:48:38,510 --> 00:48:36,000
deploying these to sort of say to the

1226
00:48:40,490 --> 00:48:38,520
U.S you tell the Taiwanese to back down

1227
00:48:43,010 --> 00:48:40,500
otherwise we're you know we're just

1228
00:48:44,030 --> 00:48:43,020
gonna annihilate your entire Battle

1229
00:48:46,069 --> 00:48:44,040
Force

1230
00:48:47,470 --> 00:48:46,079
um I mean I guess some of the UAP thing

1231
00:48:50,450 --> 00:48:47,480
on the right there is less of a

1232
00:48:52,790 --> 00:48:50,460
manifested military Dimension to it sure

1233
00:48:55,309 --> 00:48:52,800
but the broad parameters of the physics

1234
00:48:57,230 --> 00:48:55,319
would suggest you know a capability to

1235
00:48:59,630 --> 00:48:57,240
deliver threat yeah so if something's

1236
00:49:01,609 --> 00:48:59,640
going faster than the speed of uh light

1237
00:49:04,849 --> 00:49:01,619
can you really put a machine gun on it I

1238
00:49:07,670 --> 00:49:04,859
don't know right so

1239
00:49:11,030 --> 00:49:07,680
yeah and along those lines you've been

1240
00:49:12,890 --> 00:49:11,040
covering uh the war in Ukraine since it

1241
00:49:15,770 --> 00:49:12,900
began and

1242
00:49:17,510 --> 00:49:15,780
um you know here we are arguably over a

1243
00:49:19,069 --> 00:49:17,520
year into that conflict depending on

1244
00:49:20,569 --> 00:49:19,079
whether you're talking about when they

1245
00:49:22,609 --> 00:49:20,579
actually invaded or when they started

1246
00:49:23,690 --> 00:49:22,619
lining up and the preparation and all

1247
00:49:25,910 --> 00:49:23,700
that

1248
00:49:27,770 --> 00:49:25,920
um you have a strong background in

1249
00:49:29,089 --> 00:49:27,780
looking at the military capabilities of

1250
00:49:31,550 --> 00:49:29,099
Russia and China

1251
00:49:34,430 --> 00:49:31,560
now along with what you're saying there

1252
00:49:36,349 --> 00:49:34,440
is there anything that you've seen in

1253
00:49:38,569 --> 00:49:36,359
that conflict that that directly

1254
00:49:40,130 --> 00:49:38,579
reflects directly or indirectly other

1255
00:49:43,130 --> 00:49:40,140
than what you just mentioned that really

1256
00:49:46,190 --> 00:49:43,140
reflects back onto the UAP issue and

1257
00:49:48,770 --> 00:49:46,200
really tracing the source or or anything

1258
00:49:50,990 --> 00:49:48,780
else in in relation to kind of like the

1259
00:49:52,730 --> 00:49:51,000
war in Ukraine and and what can be

1260
00:49:53,750 --> 00:49:52,740
derived from that in terms of the UAP

1261
00:49:56,210 --> 00:49:53,760
issue

1262
00:49:58,910 --> 00:49:56,220
I mean if anything it's the the the

1263
00:50:00,530 --> 00:49:58,920
inverse right that you know the Russians

1264
00:50:05,030 --> 00:50:00,540
have shown themselves

1265
00:50:09,050 --> 00:50:05,040
command and control Logistics air power

1266
00:50:11,210 --> 00:50:09,060
um far weaker uh census operational

1267
00:50:14,210 --> 00:50:11,220
security far weaker than

1268
00:50:16,430 --> 00:50:14,220
I and most I think people looking at

1269
00:50:18,710 --> 00:50:16,440
them in before certainly the US military

1270
00:50:20,569 --> 00:50:18,720
had assessed them to be at I mean they

1271
00:50:22,370 --> 00:50:20,579
so the idea that they have these

1272
00:50:26,089 --> 00:50:22,380
breakthrough Technologies in terms of

1273
00:50:28,490 --> 00:50:26,099
you know Battlefield capabilities it's

1274
00:50:31,550 --> 00:50:28,500
really you know limited to a

1275
00:50:34,370 --> 00:50:31,560
small number of their best missile

1276
00:50:37,730 --> 00:50:34,380
platforms where the Russians do have

1277
00:50:40,670 --> 00:50:37,740
breakthrough success you know and which

1278
00:50:44,470 --> 00:50:40,680
also attenuates to their desire to kind

1279
00:50:47,809 --> 00:50:44,480
of be perpetually interested in you know

1280
00:50:49,910 --> 00:50:47,819
UAP related issues is

1281
00:50:51,770 --> 00:50:49,920
um more on the kind of Boutique

1282
00:50:53,569 --> 00:50:51,780
intelligence world so I would say

1283
00:50:55,849 --> 00:50:53,579
directed energy weapons which I think is

1284
00:50:58,130 --> 00:50:55,859
a responsible the Russians for a lot of

1285
00:50:59,809 --> 00:50:58,140
the Havana syndrome stuff

1286
00:51:01,430 --> 00:50:59,819
um but it's I mean it's a perfect

1287
00:51:03,230 --> 00:51:01,440
Russian game for them there because

1288
00:51:05,450 --> 00:51:03,240
there is a paranoia element that is

1289
00:51:08,630 --> 00:51:05,460
driving that but there's also a I would

1290
00:51:11,089 --> 00:51:08,640
say the evidence suggests a physical

1291
00:51:14,390 --> 00:51:11,099
um you know capability driving it that

1292
00:51:16,430 --> 00:51:14,400
they were more advanced than we are

1293
00:51:18,530 --> 00:51:16,440
um and

1294
00:51:19,910 --> 00:51:18,540
um but in much of the same way as the

1295
00:51:21,049 --> 00:51:19,920
UAP issue the US government doesn't

1296
00:51:22,970 --> 00:51:21,059
really quite know how to deal with that

1297
00:51:24,589 --> 00:51:22,980
because they don't want to I would say

1298
00:51:28,490 --> 00:51:24,599
admit that the Russians have been doing

1299
00:51:31,549 --> 00:51:28,500
very aggressive yeah I mean

1300
00:51:34,250 --> 00:51:31,559
yeah right yeah how do you address that

1301
00:51:37,250 --> 00:51:34,260
and admit it and and reveal that without

1302
00:51:39,829 --> 00:51:37,260
you know taking a more like step next

1303
00:51:41,329 --> 00:51:39,839
but for hurting all these people but but

1304
00:51:42,890 --> 00:51:41,339
the government still says well we don't

1305
00:51:44,990 --> 00:51:42,900
know anything there and we're looking at

1306
00:51:46,609 --> 00:51:45,000
it and we can't find anything well you

1307
00:51:49,309 --> 00:51:46,619
know I know for a fact that is not the

1308
00:51:51,230 --> 00:51:49,319
consensus Viewpoint of you know some

1309
00:51:53,030 --> 00:51:51,240
close U.S allies can't understand why

1310
00:51:55,250 --> 00:51:53,040
the US has been so reticent to address

1311
00:51:56,750 --> 00:51:55,260
something going on and I also know that

1312
00:51:59,270 --> 00:51:56,760
there's some very sensitive intelligence

1313
00:52:01,250 --> 00:51:59,280
that would give a very confident idea

1314
00:52:03,049 --> 00:52:01,260
that the Russians have had a role in at

1315
00:52:06,109 --> 00:52:03,059
least some of those incidents

1316
00:52:08,569 --> 00:52:06,119
um and so to me you know this is the the

1317
00:52:09,950 --> 00:52:08,579
thing you learn in Washington is not

1318
00:52:11,569 --> 00:52:09,960
because people are bad not because

1319
00:52:12,829 --> 00:52:11,579
they're traitors not because they want

1320
00:52:16,010 --> 00:52:12,839
to lie to the American people but

1321
00:52:17,510 --> 00:52:16,020
bureaucracies want the easiest path

1322
00:52:19,069 --> 00:52:17,520
through ultimately they don't want to

1323
00:52:20,510 --> 00:52:19,079
rock the boat

1324
00:52:22,309 --> 00:52:20,520
um both because they have things they

1325
00:52:23,990 --> 00:52:22,319
need to do again you know dealing with

1326
00:52:26,930 --> 00:52:24,000
China and Russia and that military

1327
00:52:29,450 --> 00:52:26,940
Battlefield thing but also because you

1328
00:52:31,430 --> 00:52:29,460
know political Masters would prefer you

1329
00:52:33,230 --> 00:52:31,440
know you know the president no president

1330
00:52:34,970 --> 00:52:33,240
particularly wants to be told difficult

1331
00:52:37,970 --> 00:52:34,980
things you need to address this right

1332
00:52:40,490 --> 00:52:37,980
it's it's just you've got enough other

1333
00:52:42,109 --> 00:52:40,500
[\h__\h] going on that you you know want to

1334
00:52:43,990 --> 00:52:42,119
focus on that especially when you're 82

1335
00:52:47,569 --> 00:52:44,000
you just want to get through the term

1336
00:52:50,870 --> 00:52:47,579
I'm just kidding well no yeah I mean

1337
00:52:53,930 --> 00:52:50,880
it's a tough job I mean you know it's

1338
00:52:57,410 --> 00:52:53,940
it's 82 I got to deal with UAP and

1339
00:52:59,750 --> 00:52:57,420
Havana syndrome get me out of here yeah

1340
00:53:01,490 --> 00:52:59,760
um speaking of Russia though uh I I mean

1341
00:53:02,990 --> 00:53:01,500
I forget the source and I apologize

1342
00:53:06,109 --> 00:53:03,000
about this but there was something about

1343
00:53:08,390 --> 00:53:06,119
uh that some Russia general or something

1344
00:53:11,270 --> 00:53:08,400
said they figured out how to how to bait

1345
00:53:12,950 --> 00:53:11,280
or coax UAP my question for you is do

1346
00:53:16,970 --> 00:53:12,960
you know anything about America doing

1347
00:53:18,230 --> 00:53:16,980
that any successes or efforts yeah you

1348
00:53:20,390 --> 00:53:18,240
know I have to

1349
00:53:21,710 --> 00:53:20,400
um because I need to this Tim McMillan

1350
00:53:25,790 --> 00:53:21,720
um and I both

1351
00:53:27,470 --> 00:53:25,800
um so I would say uh you know yes but

1352
00:53:29,329 --> 00:53:27,480
it's still something I'm working on to

1353
00:53:30,650 --> 00:53:29,339
try and get to the point where it would

1354
00:53:33,290 --> 00:53:30,660
be

1355
00:53:36,589 --> 00:53:33,300
um you know reportable

1356
00:53:39,670 --> 00:53:36,599
um but I you know one of the things that

1357
00:53:43,849 --> 00:53:42,349
rightly I think you know sensitive in

1358
00:53:45,170 --> 00:53:43,859
terms of the sense of cyber we talked

1359
00:53:47,630 --> 00:53:45,180
about you know why can't we release more

1360
00:53:48,770 --> 00:53:47,640
imagery we should or the U.S government

1361
00:53:51,530 --> 00:53:48,780
should

1362
00:53:53,569 --> 00:53:51,540
um when you get into kind of Senses how

1363
00:53:55,370 --> 00:53:53,579
you configure them how you operate them

1364
00:53:56,870 --> 00:53:55,380
in any one moment you know the kind of

1365
00:53:58,190 --> 00:53:56,880
different power levels the platform you

1366
00:54:00,770 --> 00:53:58,200
know you think about the most basic

1367
00:54:02,390 --> 00:54:00,780
level active and passive sonar

1368
00:54:05,690 --> 00:54:02,400
um those things will have different

1369
00:54:08,329 --> 00:54:05,700
reactions in terms of you know if you're

1370
00:54:10,250 --> 00:54:08,339
pinged with active sonar you know

1371
00:54:12,230 --> 00:54:10,260
um you're going to know about it as a

1372
00:54:14,030 --> 00:54:12,240
you know you're a Submariner and you're

1373
00:54:15,890 --> 00:54:14,040
going to respond in a certain way so if

1374
00:54:19,309 --> 00:54:15,900
you start playing around with different

1375
00:54:21,349 --> 00:54:19,319
settings on very Advanced sensors you

1376
00:54:23,569 --> 00:54:21,359
know you might trigger a reaction and

1377
00:54:24,650 --> 00:54:23,579
certainly the Navy you know

1378
00:54:26,569 --> 00:54:24,660
um

1379
00:54:28,430 --> 00:54:26,579
is aware

1380
00:54:30,410 --> 00:54:28,440
um again I mean it is you know still

1381
00:54:31,910 --> 00:54:30,420
classified although I think it's pretty

1382
00:54:33,710 --> 00:54:31,920
basic

1383
00:54:35,329 --> 00:54:33,720
um that there is a connection point

1384
00:54:37,430 --> 00:54:35,339
between

1385
00:54:40,190 --> 00:54:37,440
um you know nuclear signatures and

1386
00:54:42,049 --> 00:54:40,200
intercepts by uaps

1387
00:54:43,609 --> 00:54:42,059
um and you know

1388
00:54:45,470 --> 00:54:43,619
part of the reason I think the

1389
00:54:47,510 --> 00:54:45,480
classification is that something can

1390
00:54:50,329 --> 00:54:47,520
detect nuclear forces at very long range

1391
00:54:52,549 --> 00:54:50,339
and do rapid intercept that's obviously

1392
00:54:54,170 --> 00:54:52,559
technological concern there that you

1393
00:54:56,510 --> 00:54:54,180
know your strategic nuclear forces are

1394
00:54:58,730 --> 00:54:56,520
vulnerable but you know

1395
00:55:00,049 --> 00:54:58,740
um how does that work and so one of the

1396
00:55:01,549 --> 00:55:00,059
you know things I've been trying to work

1397
00:55:03,170 --> 00:55:01,559
on is you know is there a lot the

1398
00:55:05,210 --> 00:55:03,180
extremely long-range anti-neutrino

1399
00:55:07,849 --> 00:55:05,220
detection that these things are using I

1400
00:55:09,290 --> 00:55:07,859
mean you get into physics and you know a

1401
00:55:10,370 --> 00:55:09,300
lot of professors sometimes thinking

1402
00:55:12,410 --> 00:55:10,380
what the hell are you talking about and

1403
00:55:13,790 --> 00:55:12,420
then you know but sometimes they're very

1404
00:55:16,609 --> 00:55:13,800
kind of helpful

1405
00:55:19,790 --> 00:55:16,619
um you know but but yes I mean I think

1406
00:55:22,250 --> 00:55:19,800
you know I I think the US has done that

1407
00:55:24,349 --> 00:55:22,260
I think you know I'm I'm confident about

1408
00:55:26,390 --> 00:55:24,359
that that the challenge is getting to a

1409
00:55:29,329 --> 00:55:26,400
point where

1410
00:55:31,069 --> 00:55:29,339
um you can put it into a you know

1411
00:55:33,829 --> 00:55:31,079
reported product

1412
00:55:35,270 --> 00:55:33,839
um because again it's you want to get

1413
00:55:36,650 --> 00:55:35,280
this subject right but I would say that

1414
00:55:37,670 --> 00:55:36,660
you know

1415
00:55:40,250 --> 00:55:37,680
um

1416
00:55:42,589 --> 00:55:40,260
it you know it would it would make sense

1417
00:55:44,870 --> 00:55:42,599
that you would want to

1418
00:55:45,589 --> 00:55:44,880
um you know figure out

1419
00:55:47,809 --> 00:55:45,599
um

1420
00:55:49,849 --> 00:55:47,819
how how things respond to certain things

1421
00:55:50,750 --> 00:55:49,859
yeah because then you can catch and I

1422
00:55:53,390 --> 00:55:50,760
don't want to be addressed for

1423
00:55:55,609 --> 00:55:53,400
engineering and I know with this subject

1424
00:55:56,870 --> 00:55:55,619
as well I don't want to be sometimes

1425
00:55:59,150 --> 00:55:56,880
there can be

1426
00:56:00,589 --> 00:55:59,160
temptation to kind of be all the

1427
00:56:02,390 --> 00:56:00,599
Mystique of the subject and I'm not

1428
00:56:04,609 --> 00:56:02,400
telling you what and and you know I

1429
00:56:06,589 --> 00:56:04,619
guess to a degree I'm doing that what I

1430
00:56:08,990 --> 00:56:06,599
would say is the things that I'm trying

1431
00:56:11,270 --> 00:56:09,000
to work on you need multiple sources on

1432
00:56:12,589 --> 00:56:11,280
this stuff because of how extraordinary

1433
00:56:14,569 --> 00:56:12,599
it is

1434
00:56:16,670 --> 00:56:14,579
um and I've spoken you know at various

1435
00:56:18,410 --> 00:56:16,680
levels of this you know I would say I

1436
00:56:20,510 --> 00:56:18,420
have at least one or two

1437
00:56:23,089 --> 00:56:20,520
extremely good sources you know

1438
00:56:24,890 --> 00:56:23,099
including most of the time people who no

1439
00:56:27,049 --> 00:56:24,900
one's heard about right you know because

1440
00:56:28,609 --> 00:56:27,059
they're just people doing something in a

1441
00:56:30,230 --> 00:56:28,619
in a specialized field in the government

1442
00:56:32,210 --> 00:56:30,240
or military

1443
00:56:34,490 --> 00:56:32,220
um but you need to nail it down because

1444
00:56:38,329 --> 00:56:34,500
the moment you know I think you get it

1445
00:56:40,370 --> 00:56:38,339
wrong uh you know you you you weaken the

1446
00:56:42,230 --> 00:56:40,380
subject matter significantly and you

1447
00:56:44,150 --> 00:56:42,240
allow it to be played off as a great

1448
00:56:46,549 --> 00:56:44,160
conspiracy and and I would say it's an

1449
00:56:49,250 --> 00:56:46,559
extension to that I I do

1450
00:56:51,829 --> 00:56:49,260
um although you know I I disagree with

1451
00:56:54,049 --> 00:56:51,839
his you know assessments and things

1452
00:56:55,130 --> 00:56:54,059
um you know there is a I think an

1453
00:56:59,450 --> 00:56:55,140
important role for people like Stephen

1454
00:57:02,270 --> 00:56:59,460
Green Street holding you know uh I mean

1455
00:57:04,309 --> 00:57:02,280
I think you know he he Revels in it but

1456
00:57:06,530 --> 00:57:04,319
you know you've we've got it those of us

1457
00:57:08,450 --> 00:57:06,540
who to who think something extraordinary

1458
00:57:10,609 --> 00:57:08,460
is going on as journalists you know need

1459
00:57:11,809 --> 00:57:10,619
to be able to

1460
00:57:14,089 --> 00:57:11,819
you know

1461
00:57:17,030 --> 00:57:14,099
um make sure make sure that we drop the

1462
00:57:18,890 --> 00:57:17,040
eyes and cross the t's when we do it and

1463
00:57:20,930 --> 00:57:18,900
um you know until now I've kind of been

1464
00:57:22,910 --> 00:57:20,940
you know helped I think a little bit in

1465
00:57:25,730 --> 00:57:22,920
terms of what I've written you know

1466
00:57:27,349 --> 00:57:25,740
which I stand by obviously but but

1467
00:57:28,730 --> 00:57:27,359
um by the fact that I'm kind of in you

1468
00:57:31,670 --> 00:57:28,740
know opinion jealous I can have people

1469
00:57:33,650 --> 00:57:31,680
on very deep background or or even off

1470
00:57:36,230 --> 00:57:33,660
the Record guiding me to to say things

1471
00:57:38,870 --> 00:57:36,240
but I think you know as we take the next

1472
00:57:40,730 --> 00:57:38,880
steps and whether that's you know

1473
00:57:41,690 --> 00:57:40,740
materials

1474
00:57:43,730 --> 00:57:41,700
um

1475
00:57:45,650 --> 00:57:43,740
know what's behind this

1476
00:57:46,970 --> 00:57:45,660
Etc you know you you've got to be able

1477
00:57:49,190 --> 00:57:46,980
to nail it down otherwise you're going

1478
00:57:52,069 --> 00:57:49,200
to have the kind of response you know

1479
00:57:54,410 --> 00:57:52,079
easily in in that you see from other

1480
00:57:56,569 --> 00:57:54,420
journalists who just say oh it's all you

1481
00:57:58,849 --> 00:57:56,579
know we can't find green men and make a

1482
00:58:01,130 --> 00:57:58,859
joke out of it yeah I mean the first

1483
00:58:03,049 --> 00:58:01,140
time you mentioned a UAP and it you know

1484
00:58:05,510 --> 00:58:03,059
a year goes by and it turns out to be a

1485
00:58:08,150 --> 00:58:05,520
drone you're screwed

1486
00:58:09,770 --> 00:58:08,160
you know yeah but but you know the

1487
00:58:10,910 --> 00:58:09,780
fortunate thing again which is why this

1488
00:58:12,470 --> 00:58:10,920
you know there is an extraordinary

1489
00:58:15,890 --> 00:58:12,480
element to this is

1490
00:58:18,890 --> 00:58:15,900
when you have people telling you you

1491
00:58:21,829 --> 00:58:18,900
know I have seen this oh yeah I saw that

1492
00:58:24,349 --> 00:58:21,839
as well on the imagery uh or if you have

1493
00:58:26,210 --> 00:58:24,359
you know a someone Manning a sensor

1494
00:58:28,849 --> 00:58:26,220
system you described it and said how

1495
00:58:30,890 --> 00:58:28,859
Exquisite the return the data return was

1496
00:58:32,870 --> 00:58:30,900
and and it matched all the things that

1497
00:58:34,910 --> 00:58:32,880
you would guide you know that would tell

1498
00:58:37,309 --> 00:58:34,920
you this is very unlikely to be

1499
00:58:39,890 --> 00:58:37,319
anomalous right if you have multiple

1500
00:58:41,870 --> 00:58:39,900
sense assistance in an individual you're

1501
00:58:43,910 --> 00:58:41,880
basically picking multiple things right

1502
00:58:45,890 --> 00:58:43,920
that are redundant you know and that

1503
00:58:48,650 --> 00:58:45,900
exists in a redundant fashion so that if

1504
00:58:50,450 --> 00:58:48,660
we go to war you know shooting down one

1505
00:58:52,849 --> 00:58:50,460
destroying a satellite doesn't

1506
00:58:54,770 --> 00:58:52,859
necessarily mean you're totally blinded

1507
00:58:56,510 --> 00:58:54,780
right you want multiple things picking

1508
00:58:58,730 --> 00:58:56,520
being able to track something if

1509
00:59:01,370 --> 00:58:58,740
multiple things are tracking something

1510
00:59:02,809 --> 00:59:01,380
and returning you know Exquisite returns

1511
00:59:04,490 --> 00:59:02,819
over a period

1512
00:59:05,990 --> 00:59:04,500
then something's probably going on there

1513
00:59:08,569 --> 00:59:06,000
that's not an anomalous return because

1514
00:59:11,569 --> 00:59:08,579
it's an or if it you know that those are

1515
00:59:15,650 --> 00:59:11,579
a lot of anomalies to be happening uh in

1516
00:59:18,650 --> 00:59:15,660
a probability sense and so you know yeah

1517
00:59:21,349 --> 00:59:18,660
absolutely and along those lines I

1518
00:59:23,289 --> 00:59:21,359
remember Christopher melon stating that

1519
00:59:26,569 --> 00:59:23,299
one of the his one of his biggest

1520
00:59:29,150 --> 00:59:26,579
disappointments uh for the the house

1521
00:59:32,030 --> 00:59:29,160
hearing that happened last year

1522
00:59:35,150 --> 00:59:32,040
um was that more questions weren't asked

1523
00:59:38,450 --> 00:59:35,160
or put to Moultrie and Bray with regard

1524
00:59:41,690 --> 00:59:38,460
to whether there have been any sightings

1525
00:59:44,569 --> 00:59:41,700
uh in space or coming into orbit that

1526
00:59:46,549 --> 00:59:44,579
you know exhibited those those anomalous

1527
00:59:49,910 --> 00:59:46,559
observables right

1528
00:59:52,130 --> 00:59:49,920
um right yeah and along those lines you

1529
00:59:54,289 --> 00:59:52,140
know in this in this

1530
00:59:55,670 --> 00:59:54,299
you know from what you hear behind the

1531
00:59:58,250 --> 00:59:55,680
scenes and what from what you hear from

1532
01:00:00,950 --> 00:59:58,260
your sources you know there's there is

1533
01:00:02,990 --> 01:00:00,960
the sensitivity of of those of Those

1534
01:00:05,870 --> 01:00:03,000
sensors as you're talking about and then

1535
01:00:07,370 --> 01:00:05,880
there's also a lot of talk

1536
01:00:10,430 --> 01:00:07,380
um kind of behind closed doors these

1537
01:00:14,630 --> 01:00:10,440
days about the possibility of recovered

1538
01:00:16,609 --> 01:00:14,640
craft and uh you know and more exotic

1539
01:00:18,530 --> 01:00:16,619
materials and even maybe biological

1540
01:00:21,950 --> 01:00:18,540
specimens and things along those lines

1541
01:00:25,069 --> 01:00:21,960
and folks all the way from say George

1542
01:00:27,410 --> 01:00:25,079
Knapp to uh Leslie Kane and Ralph

1543
01:00:28,730 --> 01:00:27,420
Blumenthal reporting about say Eric

1544
01:00:30,829 --> 01:00:28,740
Davis

1545
01:00:33,890 --> 01:00:30,839
um uh you know in the New York Times

1546
01:00:38,589 --> 01:00:33,900
talking about having briefed folks about

1547
01:00:42,650 --> 01:00:38,599
the the realities in his estimation of

1548
01:00:44,630 --> 01:00:42,660
recovered materials uh not made on this

1549
01:00:46,190 --> 01:00:44,640
Earth or not made by human hands however

1550
01:00:48,890 --> 01:00:46,200
you know whichever quote you want to go

1551
01:00:50,870 --> 01:00:48,900
with that way you know what do you you

1552
01:00:52,549 --> 01:00:50,880
know does that does that area of the

1553
01:00:55,010 --> 01:00:52,559
topic excite you is that so something

1554
01:00:58,069 --> 01:00:55,020
that that you've heard

1555
01:00:59,750 --> 01:00:58,079
um that you've heard talk about and is

1556
01:01:03,109 --> 01:00:59,760
that an angle that you're interested in

1557
01:01:05,750 --> 01:01:03,119
pursuing in the days and months ahead

1558
01:01:08,569 --> 01:01:05,760
yeah I mean look if if there was to be

1559
01:01:09,950 --> 01:01:08,579
some kind of recovered non-uh you know

1560
01:01:11,329 --> 01:01:09,960
non-human

1561
01:01:13,970 --> 01:01:11,339
um vehicle I mean that would be the Holy

1562
01:01:15,170 --> 01:01:13,980
Grail both of the subject in a sense but

1563
01:01:16,910 --> 01:01:15,180
also

1564
01:01:19,069 --> 01:01:16,920
um I guess the Holy Grail would be you

1565
01:01:20,630 --> 01:01:19,079
know The Next Step Beyond that but

1566
01:01:23,089 --> 01:01:20,640
um it would be

1567
01:01:24,530 --> 01:01:23,099
how is it that that's that sort of hits

1568
01:01:26,690 --> 01:01:24,540
the point is how is the National

1569
01:01:28,789 --> 01:01:26,700
Security journalist which I I think

1570
01:01:30,829 --> 01:01:28,799
there's a as much as there is a real

1571
01:01:32,329 --> 01:01:30,839
need for uh caution and prudent

1572
01:01:34,370 --> 01:01:32,339
journalism

1573
01:01:35,930 --> 01:01:34,380
um and and you know that I'm trying to

1574
01:01:37,250 --> 01:01:35,940
take that on myself to slow down a bit

1575
01:01:41,210 --> 01:01:37,260
and try and Dot the eyes and cross the

1576
01:01:41,990 --> 01:01:41,220
t's perhaps um there's also you know a

1577
01:01:43,670 --> 01:01:42,000
great

1578
01:01:45,289 --> 01:01:43,680
um we talk about declining Trust in

1579
01:01:47,750 --> 01:01:45,299
Media but I would say in the National

1580
01:01:49,309 --> 01:01:47,760
Security space it is absurd and pathetic

1581
01:01:51,109 --> 01:01:49,319
quite frankly that more National

1582
01:01:53,089 --> 01:01:51,119
Security journalists don't

1583
01:01:55,789 --> 01:01:53,099
you know take this more seriously and

1584
01:01:57,230 --> 01:01:55,799
engage with it more seriously because

1585
01:01:59,150 --> 01:01:57,240
um yes it's complicated and yes there's

1586
01:02:01,130 --> 01:01:59,160
a huge amount of stigma

1587
01:02:02,809 --> 01:02:01,140
um but something clearly going on and

1588
01:02:04,789 --> 01:02:02,819
they're a hell of a lot better National

1589
01:02:07,250 --> 01:02:04,799
Security journalists than me who must

1590
01:02:08,870 --> 01:02:07,260
have better sources than me who must be

1591
01:02:10,609 --> 01:02:08,880
telling them the same thing my sources

1592
01:02:12,589 --> 01:02:10,619
are telling me to a degree and why

1593
01:02:14,569 --> 01:02:12,599
aren't they writing about it right you

1594
01:02:16,370 --> 01:02:14,579
know to me again stigma is the only

1595
01:02:18,470 --> 01:02:16,380
rational answer

1596
01:02:21,410 --> 01:02:18,480
um but yeah no I mean certainly you know

1597
01:02:24,410 --> 01:02:21,420
it is an area but again you know what I

1598
01:02:26,210 --> 01:02:24,420
would say is my work on that leads me to

1599
01:02:29,569 --> 01:02:26,220
believe there isn't some Grand

1600
01:02:32,510 --> 01:02:29,579
conspiracy at scale in terms of covering

1601
01:02:34,730 --> 01:02:32,520
something up like that because

1602
01:02:36,829 --> 01:02:34,740
um you know there are people that I've

1603
01:02:40,069 --> 01:02:36,839
talked to who would be

1604
01:02:41,270 --> 01:02:40,079
you should know if the US government is

1605
01:02:43,430 --> 01:02:41,280
working on stuff like that because they

1606
01:02:46,430 --> 01:02:43,440
would have a reason to know

1607
01:02:47,870 --> 01:02:46,440
um but it also pushes me to think if

1608
01:02:50,809 --> 01:02:47,880
there is something there and again you

1609
01:02:51,950 --> 01:02:50,819
know obviously I I think you know there

1610
01:02:54,349 --> 01:02:51,960
are

1611
01:02:56,089 --> 01:02:54,359
people in positions who you know might

1612
01:02:58,069 --> 01:02:56,099
know who are saying they're they're you

1613
01:02:59,690 --> 01:02:58,079
know is something there that it that it

1614
01:03:01,670 --> 01:02:59,700
would be pushed to

1615
01:03:04,130 --> 01:03:01,680
um contractors and and pushed outside

1616
01:03:05,750 --> 01:03:04,140
the normal reporting chains which is why

1617
01:03:08,329 --> 01:03:05,760
I think you see Congress working on that

1618
01:03:10,370 --> 01:03:08,339
as well uh because that is how you would

1619
01:03:14,750 --> 01:03:10,380
hide something

1620
01:03:17,089 --> 01:03:14,760
um from disclosure and

1621
01:03:17,990 --> 01:03:17,099
and obviously the extreme sensitivity of

1622
01:03:20,150 --> 01:03:18,000
it

1623
01:03:21,890 --> 01:03:20,160
um you know perhaps would motivate you

1624
01:03:24,349 --> 01:03:21,900
do that I mean but again you need that

1625
01:03:26,569 --> 01:03:24,359
also goes back to the legal

1626
01:03:27,890 --> 01:03:26,579
um side of this that you know a certain

1627
01:03:31,190 --> 01:03:27,900
point people

1628
01:03:33,109 --> 01:03:31,200
you know I think probably and again you

1629
01:03:34,730 --> 01:03:33,119
know to say this is my kind of just

1630
01:03:36,410 --> 01:03:34,740
talking off the cuff here versus you

1631
01:03:38,569 --> 01:03:36,420
know reporting piece I mean my instinct

1632
01:03:41,329 --> 01:03:38,579
tells me that people have lied you know

1633
01:03:44,329 --> 01:03:41,339
to Congress to conceal things

1634
01:03:47,990 --> 01:03:44,339
um uh and and so you need to provide a

1635
01:03:49,970 --> 01:03:48,000
mechanism for them to be able to to

1636
01:03:51,589 --> 01:03:49,980
um start telling the truth in a way that

1637
01:03:53,030 --> 01:03:51,599
facilitates them not going to federal

1638
01:03:55,970 --> 01:03:53,040
prison

1639
01:03:58,309 --> 01:03:55,980
um and and and I think that process is

1640
01:04:00,410 --> 01:03:58,319
is underway and I also think what's

1641
01:04:01,670 --> 01:04:00,420
what's you know notable we talked just

1642
01:04:04,490 --> 01:04:01,680
back to just so people can understand

1643
01:04:05,870 --> 01:04:04,500
the idea of you know public servants

1644
01:04:08,150 --> 01:04:05,880
versus

1645
01:04:11,510 --> 01:04:08,160
um you know

1646
01:04:13,670 --> 01:04:11,520
um people covering things up you know

1647
01:04:15,890 --> 01:04:13,680
um Bray you know oh and I you know has

1648
01:04:17,630 --> 01:04:15,900
really fantastic reputation in terms of

1649
01:04:19,250 --> 01:04:17,640
you know really important things for the

1650
01:04:21,289 --> 01:04:19,260
nation because very dedicated public

1651
01:04:23,150 --> 01:04:21,299
servant but I think his in particip with

1652
01:04:25,490 --> 01:04:23,160
this is probably you know I got other

1653
01:04:27,410 --> 01:04:25,500
stuff going on that is more again war

1654
01:04:29,329 --> 01:04:27,420
with Taiwan coming

1655
01:04:32,390 --> 01:04:29,339
um same with the Navy you know they want

1656
01:04:34,430 --> 01:04:32,400
to focus on that immediate concern and

1657
01:04:38,210 --> 01:04:34,440
part of the way they can do that without

1658
01:04:40,069 --> 01:04:38,220
lying to Congress is

1659
01:04:42,530 --> 01:04:40,079
essentially kind of relatively

1660
01:04:44,089 --> 01:04:42,540
insulating themselves from you know the

1661
01:04:45,890 --> 01:04:44,099
subject area and I think a great example

1662
01:04:47,329 --> 01:04:45,900
we saw of that was I think it was

1663
01:04:49,490 --> 01:04:47,339
Gallagher who asked the question with

1664
01:04:50,750 --> 01:04:49,500
the Maelstrom incidents right they

1665
01:04:53,089 --> 01:04:50,760
hadn't even heard

1666
01:04:55,190 --> 01:04:53,099
you know and that's that's took I was

1667
01:04:56,809 --> 01:04:55,200
like how could you not have heard of

1668
01:04:58,190 --> 01:04:56,819
that if you were sort of running this

1669
01:05:00,950 --> 01:04:58,200
effort and I think part of that is is

1670
01:05:02,569 --> 01:05:00,960
quite deliberate it's like I just tell

1671
01:05:06,370 --> 01:05:02,579
me what I absolutely need to know but

1672
01:05:08,990 --> 01:05:06,380
keep this [\h__\h] away from me because

1673
01:05:11,390 --> 01:05:09,000
and again that that doesn't mean this

1674
01:05:12,789 --> 01:05:11,400
and Grand conspiracy even though you

1675
01:05:14,690 --> 01:05:12,799
know there's there are probably

1676
01:05:16,309 --> 01:05:14,700
conspiratorial elements to the history

1677
01:05:18,650 --> 01:05:16,319
of this

1678
01:05:20,150 --> 01:05:18,660
um that that you know we will that we're

1679
01:05:22,190 --> 01:05:20,160
at the beginning of kind of getting to

1680
01:05:23,870 --> 01:05:22,200
the bottom of yeah sure I mean just the

1681
01:05:25,010 --> 01:05:23,880
fact that you know like you stated you

1682
01:05:26,690 --> 01:05:25,020
know there's videos and other

1683
01:05:28,309 --> 01:05:26,700
photography that could be shown if the

1684
01:05:31,970 --> 01:05:28,319
right steps were taken but they're not I

1685
01:05:35,049 --> 01:05:31,980
mean that kind of lends Credence to

1686
01:05:37,370 --> 01:05:35,059
there's a cover-up

1687
01:05:38,750 --> 01:05:37,380
deal with that I mean look I mean that I

1688
01:05:41,150 --> 01:05:38,760
mean it depends I suppose how you

1689
01:05:43,490 --> 01:05:41,160
consider the cover-up I guess I I to me

1690
01:05:46,789 --> 01:05:43,500
cover a business of you know

1691
01:05:48,589 --> 01:05:46,799
a great perception uh I guess rather

1692
01:05:51,109 --> 01:05:48,599
than a bureaucratic impulse I mean a lot

1693
01:05:53,150 --> 01:05:51,119
of stuff they choose not to declassify

1694
01:05:55,670 --> 01:05:53,160
all talk types of issues that go beyond

1695
01:05:57,589 --> 01:05:55,680
this but it was notable in that briefing

1696
01:05:59,930 --> 01:05:57,599
right where they produced that stupid

1697
01:06:02,870 --> 01:05:59,940
video of you could even see what was

1698
01:06:04,910 --> 01:06:02,880
flying by and and the idea and I had

1699
01:06:06,950 --> 01:06:04,920
multiple people tell me who were mad

1700
01:06:08,990 --> 01:06:06,960
right you know military people you know

1701
01:06:10,970 --> 01:06:09,000
especially military people now who are

1702
01:06:13,730 --> 01:06:10,980
pissed off because they've seen things

1703
01:06:15,710 --> 01:06:13,740
or people who've seen the imagery and

1704
01:06:17,990 --> 01:06:15,720
you know I suppose growing up in the UK

1705
01:06:19,190 --> 01:06:18,000
I you know have a slightly dark sense of

1706
01:06:23,030 --> 01:06:19,200
humor but

1707
01:06:24,829 --> 01:06:23,040
um you know my uh America especially my

1708
01:06:26,630 --> 01:06:24,839
American it was Korean military

1709
01:06:28,549 --> 01:06:26,640
grandfather is still alive fortunately

1710
01:06:30,470 --> 01:06:28,559
always tells me get off that subject

1711
01:06:32,089 --> 01:06:30,480
that's a bunch of bull I'm like no

1712
01:06:33,250 --> 01:06:32,099
grandpa you know I don't think it is but

1713
01:06:36,170 --> 01:06:33,260
you know anyway

1714
01:06:38,029 --> 01:06:36,180
that little addicted but but

1715
01:06:39,890 --> 01:06:38,039
um you know they had a lot of people

1716
01:06:41,089 --> 01:06:39,900
when they produced that video to say oh

1717
01:06:42,950 --> 01:06:41,099
this is what we're dealing with and it's

1718
01:06:45,230 --> 01:06:42,960
complicated do you know what that is

1719
01:06:47,930 --> 01:06:45,240
because Rita give me a break that that

1720
01:06:51,710 --> 01:06:47,940
was the the best imagery event not even

1721
01:06:53,210 --> 01:06:51,720
close uh you know and and you know you

1722
01:06:55,309 --> 01:06:53,220
hear all kinds of stories about things

1723
01:06:57,950 --> 01:06:55,319
the scene but you know there were there

1724
01:06:59,569 --> 01:06:57,960
are quite a few videos that that you

1725
01:07:01,730 --> 01:06:59,579
know have now been put in more stricter

1726
01:07:05,230 --> 01:07:01,740
places when they weren't originally

1727
01:07:08,569 --> 01:07:05,240
right and that is a cover-up yeah

1728
01:07:12,890 --> 01:07:08,579
I mean it's a kind of interpretation but

1729
01:07:14,329 --> 01:07:12,900
yeah that but I I do you know again I it

1730
01:07:16,490 --> 01:07:14,339
comes back to

1731
01:07:17,450 --> 01:07:16,500
um Congress you know has their teeth in

1732
01:07:20,870 --> 01:07:17,460
this now

1733
01:07:23,029 --> 01:07:20,880
um yeah I'm gonna let go along along

1734
01:07:24,470 --> 01:07:23,039
those lines uh in terms of a cover-up

1735
01:07:25,910 --> 01:07:24,480
and in terms of what you were talking

1736
01:07:28,549 --> 01:07:25,920
about earlier with regard to over

1737
01:07:30,650 --> 01:07:28,559
classification things along those lines

1738
01:07:33,170 --> 01:07:30,660
you know people

1739
01:07:35,870 --> 01:07:33,180
um I've heard many journalists who very

1740
01:07:37,910 --> 01:07:35,880
well in terms of intentioned journalists

1741
01:07:40,430 --> 01:07:37,920
um say for example Ross Coulter folks

1742
01:07:42,109 --> 01:07:40,440
like that talking about you know the

1743
01:07:43,670 --> 01:07:42,119
National Security concerns I've heard

1744
01:07:45,710 --> 01:07:43,680
you talking about the National Security

1745
01:07:48,049 --> 01:07:45,720
concerns before as well and you know

1746
01:07:50,569 --> 01:07:48,059
it's something that I I can see is

1747
01:07:52,370 --> 01:07:50,579
really drilled into for good reason

1748
01:07:55,730 --> 01:07:52,380
um mainstream journalists with with

1749
01:07:57,650 --> 01:07:55,740
regard to you know making sure that your

1750
01:07:59,630 --> 01:07:57,660
reporting doesn't compromise National

1751
01:08:03,589 --> 01:07:59,640
Security and that's something that is

1752
01:08:05,930 --> 01:08:03,599
often you know that that there is a

1753
01:08:09,289 --> 01:08:05,940
there can be a bit of a gray area there

1754
01:08:11,089 --> 01:08:09,299
you know historically with regard to you

1755
01:08:12,770 --> 01:08:11,099
know there's the old say like project

1756
01:08:14,150 --> 01:08:12,780
Mockingbird or things like that people

1757
01:08:16,930 --> 01:08:14,160
were talking about that earlier in the

1758
01:08:19,849 --> 01:08:16,940
chat that that there's the possibility

1759
01:08:23,030 --> 01:08:19,859
that that kind of tacit agreement

1760
01:08:25,550 --> 01:08:23,040
between journalists or mainstream media

1761
01:08:28,669 --> 01:08:25,560
organizations and say the National

1762
01:08:30,890 --> 01:08:28,679
Security apparatus to not reveal sources

1763
01:08:32,990 --> 01:08:30,900
and methods to not reveal classified

1764
01:08:36,050 --> 01:08:33,000
materials and things like that well if

1765
01:08:38,150 --> 01:08:36,060
things are being over classified or if

1766
01:08:40,370 --> 01:08:38,160
there's a gray area of that

1767
01:08:42,709 --> 01:08:40,380
classification have you do you think

1768
01:08:45,769 --> 01:08:42,719
that there's the possibility or the

1769
01:08:48,709 --> 01:08:45,779
reality and or have you experienced ever

1770
01:08:51,050 --> 01:08:48,719
a situation where you felt like

1771
01:08:53,030 --> 01:08:51,060
that there was undue pressure where

1772
01:08:55,150 --> 01:08:53,040
something was said to be a national

1773
01:08:57,590 --> 01:08:55,160
security concern or said to be

1774
01:08:58,910 --> 01:08:57,600
classified and it seemed really seemed

1775
01:09:01,610 --> 01:08:58,920
like something that should be reported

1776
01:09:06,410 --> 01:09:04,010
yes I mean you know that that happens

1777
01:09:07,669 --> 01:09:06,420
and you've obviously go to be you know

1778
01:09:09,349 --> 01:09:07,679
which I think you're hinting at very

1779
01:09:12,169 --> 01:09:09,359
politely you also have to be aware as a

1780
01:09:14,450 --> 01:09:12,179
journalist to not be co-opted right that

1781
01:09:16,610 --> 01:09:14,460
in return for Access and Prestige and

1782
01:09:18,829 --> 01:09:16,620
being invited to

1783
01:09:22,910 --> 01:09:18,839
you know parties

1784
01:09:26,150 --> 01:09:22,920
um uh you you know you've got like and

1785
01:09:27,769 --> 01:09:26,160
I'll give you well it does so there was

1786
01:09:29,510 --> 01:09:27,779
the the CIA had their Christmas party

1787
01:09:30,650 --> 01:09:29,520
which is Saturday I was not invited to

1788
01:09:32,870 --> 01:09:30,660
even though I thought I had a good

1789
01:09:33,890 --> 01:09:32,880
rapport with their Pub press on but I'm

1790
01:09:36,110 --> 01:09:33,900
pretty sure it's because I've been

1791
01:09:37,789 --> 01:09:36,120
writing on you know Havana syndrome

1792
01:09:41,269 --> 01:09:37,799
stuff and that pissed them off and you

1793
01:09:43,189 --> 01:09:41,279
know so you know but but I think you I

1794
01:09:46,010 --> 01:09:43,199
mean that's that's a silly example but

1795
01:09:48,769 --> 01:09:46,020
but you know access does go in in

1796
01:09:50,269 --> 01:09:48,779
in alongside

1797
01:09:53,390 --> 01:09:50,279
um and you know stories that they can

1798
01:09:55,790 --> 01:09:53,400
give you go alongside you keeping people

1799
01:09:58,010 --> 01:09:55,800
happy I think my Approach though to the

1800
01:10:00,110 --> 01:09:58,020
subject is try and focus on or any

1801
01:10:02,990 --> 01:10:00,120
national security subject is there a

1802
01:10:04,850 --> 01:10:03,000
threat to you know critical you know you

1803
01:10:06,709 --> 01:10:04,860
have to be decide for yourself National

1804
01:10:08,930 --> 01:10:06,719
Security interests is it a legitimate

1805
01:10:11,689 --> 01:10:08,940
concern and if you were talking about on

1806
01:10:12,530 --> 01:10:11,699
this subject you know where

1807
01:10:15,590 --> 01:10:12,540
um

1808
01:10:18,890 --> 01:10:15,600
certain you know sent New Wave you know

1809
01:10:20,930 --> 01:10:18,900
next Generation sensor systems uh stuff

1810
01:10:24,410 --> 01:10:20,940
that we use to track Hypersonic light

1811
01:10:26,209 --> 01:10:24,420
Vehicles you know how some of that works

1812
01:10:27,649 --> 01:10:26,219
and where it is you know that's

1813
01:10:30,290 --> 01:10:27,659
legitimate I think that you would want

1814
01:10:32,750 --> 01:10:30,300
to be very cautious about that

1815
01:10:35,330 --> 01:10:32,760
um even though there are clear you know

1816
01:10:37,310 --> 01:10:35,340
dividends because it it could be

1817
01:10:39,490 --> 01:10:37,320
you know you you write about that thing

1818
01:10:43,070 --> 01:10:39,500
you could really you know endanger

1819
01:10:45,110 --> 01:10:43,080
American lives um and and National

1820
01:10:46,910 --> 01:10:45,120
Security in the most you know against

1821
01:10:48,590 --> 01:10:46,920
very bad people and the Russians of the

1822
01:10:51,410 --> 01:10:48,600
Chinese government are very bad people

1823
01:10:53,689 --> 01:10:51,420
uh and we do not want them so this is my

1824
01:10:57,470 --> 01:10:53,699
phone getting off here on me I apologize

1825
01:10:59,209 --> 01:10:57,480
uh we do not want them

1826
01:11:02,209 --> 01:10:59,219
you know I would say to win

1827
01:11:03,169 --> 01:11:02,219
um yeah you know but they're also

1828
01:11:05,090 --> 01:11:03,179
um

1829
01:11:06,530 --> 01:11:05,100
you know I've

1830
01:11:07,910 --> 01:11:06,540
um

1831
01:11:09,410 --> 01:11:07,920
you know I think on this subject right

1832
01:11:10,610 --> 01:11:09,420
I've written about stuff and actually in

1833
01:11:12,649 --> 01:11:10,620
the nuclear connection which is

1834
01:11:15,649 --> 01:11:12,659
classified you know it was top secret

1835
01:11:17,750 --> 01:11:15,659
you know um I'll write about that I you

1836
01:11:19,430 --> 01:11:17,760
know some of the you know intelligence

1837
01:11:22,250 --> 01:11:19,440
World stuff I do on the Russians you

1838
01:11:24,290 --> 01:11:22,260
know is very classified you know but

1839
01:11:29,450 --> 01:11:24,300
you've got to just decide

1840
01:11:31,130 --> 01:11:29,460
um what's the um you know what's the uh

1841
01:11:32,930 --> 01:11:31,140
the right balance yeah and you know

1842
01:11:34,790 --> 01:11:32,940
ultimately it's in the eye of the

1843
01:11:36,709 --> 01:11:34,800
beholder and I appreciate that people

1844
01:11:38,630 --> 01:11:36,719
disagree

1845
01:11:41,390 --> 01:11:38,640
um I just what I would say though on

1846
01:11:42,709 --> 01:11:41,400
this subject I you know there is a you

1847
01:11:44,090 --> 01:11:42,719
know people don't want you know the

1848
01:11:46,550 --> 01:11:44,100
government certainly since more has come

1849
01:11:48,530 --> 01:11:46,560
out again I think it tends to be for the

1850
01:11:51,590 --> 01:11:48,540
reasons of bureaucracy I don't want to

1851
01:11:52,910 --> 01:11:51,600
deal with it but but you know it is not

1852
01:11:55,070 --> 01:11:52,920
writing about this subject it's not

1853
01:11:57,649 --> 01:11:55,080
something that wins your friends in the

1854
01:12:00,110 --> 01:11:57,659
National Security kind of well but I'm

1855
01:12:02,330 --> 01:12:00,120
still gonna you know keep doing on it

1856
01:12:04,430 --> 01:12:02,340
because it is the most critical

1857
01:12:07,370 --> 01:12:04,440
potentially

1858
01:12:08,470 --> 01:12:07,380
I mean issue not just of our time but of

1859
01:12:10,850 --> 01:12:08,480
all time

1860
01:12:13,790 --> 01:12:10,860
and if journalists have one

1861
01:12:17,090 --> 01:12:13,800
responsibility surely it is too

1862
01:12:18,890 --> 01:12:17,100
you know I I do yeah I do find it very

1863
01:12:20,810 --> 01:12:18,900
again going back to because it's not

1864
01:12:22,870 --> 01:12:20,820
just me right watching a video and sort

1865
01:12:25,990 --> 01:12:22,880
of you know

1866
01:12:28,430 --> 01:12:26,000
Christmas parties would be amazing

1867
01:12:29,689 --> 01:12:28,440
but again

1868
01:12:31,310 --> 01:12:29,699
against the great thing as well there

1869
01:12:33,590 --> 01:12:31,320
are a lot of people inside the

1870
01:12:35,209 --> 01:12:33,600
bureaucracy who you know it's not me

1871
01:12:38,090 --> 01:12:35,219
just plucking this out of the air right

1872
01:12:40,189 --> 01:12:38,100
it's people that you know you you

1873
01:12:41,689 --> 01:12:40,199
worked hard to develop to Source

1874
01:12:43,070 --> 01:12:41,699
relationship with who are telling you

1875
01:12:44,810 --> 01:12:43,080
this stuff and you trust them and then

1876
01:12:46,370 --> 01:12:44,820
you and the descriptions align and

1877
01:12:48,410 --> 01:12:46,380
people who don't know each other saying

1878
01:12:50,270 --> 01:12:48,420
the same thing and people who don't like

1879
01:12:51,950 --> 01:12:50,280
certain people who are more

1880
01:12:53,209 --> 01:12:51,960
public-facing in this field who used to

1881
01:12:55,010 --> 01:12:53,219
be in the government saying the same

1882
01:12:56,870 --> 01:12:55,020
thing as them and people who do like

1883
01:12:59,450 --> 01:12:56,880
them today so you know you've got to be

1884
01:13:01,610 --> 01:12:59,460
you know there's this is not just

1885
01:13:03,530 --> 01:13:01,620
um and as I say I you know

1886
01:13:04,669 --> 01:13:03,540
that wasn't false humility there are a

1887
01:13:07,189 --> 01:13:04,679
lot of better National Security

1888
01:13:10,430 --> 01:13:07,199
journalists than me who have to be told

1889
01:13:12,410 --> 01:13:10,440
by sources this stuff and I I just have

1890
01:13:16,010 --> 01:13:12,420
to assume they're just deciding yeah I

1891
01:13:18,530 --> 01:13:16,020
don't want to get into that stuff yeah

1892
01:13:20,510 --> 01:13:18,540
yeah well I appreciate all your work and

1893
01:13:22,490 --> 01:13:20,520
your hard work and doing this because

1894
01:13:25,370 --> 01:13:22,500
um there are not many

1895
01:13:27,530 --> 01:13:25,380
um talented journalists attacking this

1896
01:13:30,290 --> 01:13:27,540
subject I mean for instance NDA got past

1897
01:13:32,750 --> 01:13:30,300
30 some pages of UAP language

1898
01:13:34,729 --> 01:13:32,760
law you know for the first time ever in

1899
01:13:37,610 --> 01:13:34,739
history and there's not a peep on that

1900
01:13:40,250 --> 01:13:37,620
passing from any major media Network and

1901
01:13:42,470 --> 01:13:40,260
it's just ridiculous so I'm grateful

1902
01:13:44,450 --> 01:13:42,480
someone like you but it will so thank

1903
01:13:46,310 --> 01:13:44,460
you and look and I know as well there

1904
01:13:47,510 --> 01:13:46,320
are a lot of people

1905
01:13:49,970 --> 01:13:47,520
um

1906
01:13:51,410 --> 01:13:49,980
you know that such as yourselves who are

1907
01:13:53,270 --> 01:13:51,420
pushing this and they're doing it

1908
01:13:55,910 --> 01:13:53,280
incredibly some of the research that you

1909
01:13:57,590 --> 01:13:55,920
know people who are not I guess formal

1910
01:13:59,330 --> 01:13:57,600
journalists are doing uh is

1911
01:14:00,770 --> 01:13:59,340
extraordinary and frankly that's one

1912
01:14:03,830 --> 01:14:00,780
thing I you know should say I probably

1913
01:14:05,689 --> 01:14:03,840
haven't said enough do disagree with

1914
01:14:07,130 --> 01:14:05,699
um you know some of the journalists

1915
01:14:08,810 --> 01:14:07,140
who've been doing this along with me

1916
01:14:11,689 --> 01:14:08,820
some of their assessments

1917
01:14:14,270 --> 01:14:11,699
how they approach it sometimes but you

1918
01:14:16,430 --> 01:14:14,280
know you are

1919
01:14:18,709 --> 01:14:16,440
um this extraordinary benefit at least

1920
01:14:20,330 --> 01:14:18,719
in terms of you know stuff that you can

1921
01:14:22,850 --> 01:14:20,340
dive into

1922
01:14:24,950 --> 01:14:22,860
um of you know researchers general you

1923
01:14:26,090 --> 01:14:24,960
know George Knapp obviously you know

1924
01:14:27,830 --> 01:14:26,100
um he would be one of the people I would

1925
01:14:29,870 --> 01:14:27,840
say I do have some some pretty strong

1926
01:14:31,790 --> 01:14:29,880
disagreements with him on some stuff but

1927
01:14:33,590 --> 01:14:31,800
look he's been doing this a hell of a

1928
01:14:35,930 --> 01:14:33,600
lot longer and and the existing even if

1929
01:14:38,870 --> 01:14:35,940
you disagree with his conclusions from

1930
01:14:41,510 --> 01:14:38,880
reporting or or reporting and others you

1931
01:14:44,510 --> 01:14:41,520
know like him and there's a wealth of

1932
01:14:46,669 --> 01:14:44,520
you know documentation and and Freedom

1933
01:14:49,790 --> 01:14:46,679
of Information required you know and and

1934
01:14:52,430 --> 01:14:49,800
sort of things to think about I mean

1935
01:14:53,510 --> 01:14:52,440
um you know row at Hastings UFOs and

1936
01:14:56,750 --> 01:14:53,520
nukes

1937
01:14:58,370 --> 01:14:56,760
um you know uh people who are now

1938
01:15:00,830 --> 01:14:58,380
um obviously have died right because

1939
01:15:03,290 --> 01:15:00,840
this has been going on for a while so no

1940
01:15:08,510 --> 01:15:03,300
I mean I'm very lucky and you know I I I

1941
01:15:10,850 --> 01:15:08,520
I do need to give more uh correct to you

1942
01:15:12,770 --> 01:15:10,860
know well that's well yeah along those

1943
01:15:15,410 --> 01:15:12,780
lines so you just you're talking about

1944
01:15:17,750 --> 01:15:15,420
nap and Robert Hastings you know I've

1945
01:15:20,270 --> 01:15:17,760
heard you rattle off cases like Socorro

1946
01:15:22,189 --> 01:15:20,280
and aerial School in such a way that I

1947
01:15:24,530 --> 01:15:22,199
it's clear that you've done some really

1948
01:15:26,030 --> 01:15:24,540
deep dives into this topic

1949
01:15:29,209 --> 01:15:26,040
um would you mind mentioning some of

1950
01:15:31,250 --> 01:15:29,219
your other favorite writers researchers

1951
01:15:34,850 --> 01:15:31,260
and historians maybe it's like starting

1952
01:15:37,669 --> 01:15:34,860
with the ogs from way back and well you

1953
01:15:38,450 --> 01:15:37,679
know I mean the the

1954
01:15:41,390 --> 01:15:38,460
um

1955
01:15:43,610 --> 01:15:41,400
and I one of the things that is

1956
01:15:44,870 --> 01:15:43,620
interesting with this is that where you

1957
01:15:46,790 --> 01:15:44,880
see

1958
01:15:49,610 --> 01:15:46,800
um

1959
01:15:51,950 --> 01:15:49,620
you know just the I'm having a mind

1960
01:15:52,970 --> 01:15:51,960
blanket who is the gentleman who

1961
01:15:55,669 --> 01:15:52,980
um

1962
01:15:58,189 --> 01:15:55,679
sadly had a heart attack in I don't know

1963
01:16:01,070 --> 01:15:58,199
10 15 years ago glasses I'm having a

1964
01:16:04,189 --> 01:16:01,080
mind blank I should know famous UFO

1965
01:16:06,050 --> 01:16:04,199
ufologist Stephen Friedman sounds pretty

1966
01:16:07,970 --> 01:16:06,060
no yeah exactly of course how do I have

1967
01:16:09,350 --> 01:16:07,980
my birthday you know I I you know and

1968
01:16:11,149 --> 01:16:09,360
again I'm looking you don't have to

1969
01:16:12,350 --> 01:16:11,159
agree with everything people say in this

1970
01:16:15,229 --> 01:16:12,360
stuff but when they're talking about

1971
01:16:18,649 --> 01:16:15,239
cases and doing the writing and uh

1972
01:16:20,330 --> 01:16:18,659
absolutely you know you know it it's uh

1973
01:16:21,649 --> 01:16:20,340
it's extremely about I mean I have a

1974
01:16:24,110 --> 01:16:21,659
particularly

1975
01:16:26,930 --> 01:16:24,120
um fond view of uh Robert Hastings just

1976
01:16:29,570 --> 01:16:26,940
because I think you know that

1977
01:16:31,550 --> 01:16:29,580
um you know book you know just the the

1978
01:16:33,530 --> 01:16:31,560
level of you know detail he's gone into

1979
01:16:35,689 --> 01:16:33,540
there and the level of stigma that he

1980
01:16:37,310 --> 01:16:35,699
had to I could winch about stigma now is

1981
01:16:39,770 --> 01:16:37,320
nothing compared to what it used to be

1982
01:16:42,169 --> 01:16:39,780
and it is Shifting and and what I hope

1983
01:16:44,090 --> 01:16:42,179
will happen actually

1984
01:16:45,649 --> 01:16:44,100
um and certainly I'm going to make sure

1985
01:16:47,930 --> 01:16:45,659
it happens is when

1986
01:16:49,729 --> 01:16:47,940
you know five or ten years from now and

1987
01:16:52,189 --> 01:16:49,739
I do think it'll be you know in that

1988
01:16:54,470 --> 01:16:52,199
window and this gets a lot more media

1989
01:16:56,630 --> 01:16:54,480
attention because it is seen as more

1990
01:16:59,450 --> 01:16:56,640
credible and less stigma people remember

1991
01:17:01,970 --> 01:16:59,460
that there were you know

1992
01:17:03,470 --> 01:17:01,980
people being willing to take it on when

1993
01:17:06,470 --> 01:17:03,480
it was less

1994
01:17:09,470 --> 01:17:06,480
um you know seen as a less uh exciting

1995
01:17:11,390 --> 01:17:09,480
and legitimate uh Avenue to cover but

1996
01:17:13,310 --> 01:17:11,400
but again one of the beautiful things

1997
01:17:15,770 --> 01:17:13,320
about this subject matter is when you

1998
01:17:19,250 --> 01:17:17,750
um you know conclusions you know

1999
01:17:21,709 --> 01:17:19,260
credible Witnesses whether we think you

2000
01:17:23,450 --> 01:17:21,719
know there's a lot of and you know some

2001
01:17:25,310 --> 01:17:23,460
of the videos some of the channels that

2002
01:17:26,870 --> 01:17:25,320
people run on YouTube and Reddit or

2003
01:17:29,209 --> 01:17:26,880
whatever and

2004
01:17:30,410 --> 01:17:29,219
um you know goes like yourselves like

2005
01:17:32,450 --> 01:17:30,420
doing

2006
01:17:35,209 --> 01:17:32,460
um you know just just covering this and

2007
01:17:36,709 --> 01:17:35,219
bringing up accounts like when you see

2008
01:17:38,030 --> 01:17:36,719
you know but the school thing is

2009
01:17:40,070 --> 01:17:38,040
fascinating I mean I know what the hell

2010
01:17:41,570 --> 01:17:40,080
is going on there but absolutely when

2011
01:17:44,390 --> 01:17:41,580
you have the same type of witness

2012
01:17:47,450 --> 01:17:44,400
experience over multiple decades you

2013
01:17:49,910 --> 01:17:47,460
know in Wales in the UK and or it's got

2014
01:17:52,370 --> 01:17:49,920
like a Melbourne Australia you know

2015
01:17:55,310 --> 01:17:52,380
Ariel you know very similar descriptions

2016
01:17:56,630 --> 01:17:55,320
by mass Witnesses

2017
01:17:58,729 --> 01:17:56,640
um you know the football stadium

2018
01:18:00,770 --> 01:17:58,739
incident in Italy where there's you know

2019
01:18:03,110 --> 01:18:00,780
thousands of people now maybe this is

2020
01:18:05,810 --> 01:18:03,120
mass hallucination and some kind of you

2021
01:18:08,149 --> 01:18:05,820
know thing that's great but maybe it's

2022
01:18:09,950 --> 01:18:08,159
not and frankly I would say there's a

2023
01:18:12,050 --> 01:18:09,960
pretty you know balancing probabilities

2024
01:18:14,390 --> 01:18:12,060
when you attend with other kind of

2025
01:18:16,310 --> 01:18:14,400
witness reports I you know it's more

2026
01:18:17,630 --> 01:18:16,320
likely I would say that it's not mass

2027
01:18:19,669 --> 01:18:17,640
hallucination

2028
01:18:22,189 --> 01:18:19,679
um and you know but just being able to

2029
01:18:23,630 --> 01:18:22,199
kind of dive into that is

2030
01:18:26,270 --> 01:18:23,640
um you know I'm passionate obviously

2031
01:18:27,590 --> 01:18:26,280
about the subject at a you know personal

2032
01:18:29,450 --> 01:18:27,600
level but

2033
01:18:32,510 --> 01:18:29,460
um it's certainly you know the work that

2034
01:18:35,810 --> 01:18:32,520
others have done before makes you know

2035
01:18:39,350 --> 01:18:35,820
it a hell of a lot easier for me

2036
01:18:41,510 --> 01:18:39,360
um now I think you hit it on the head

2037
01:18:42,950 --> 01:18:41,520
too you don't have to necessarily agree

2038
01:18:45,770 --> 01:18:42,960
with somebody's

2039
01:18:47,630 --> 01:18:45,780
um you know a final explanation or

2040
01:18:49,189 --> 01:18:47,640
synopsis because let's get real how do

2041
01:18:52,070 --> 01:18:49,199
they know they don't know they don't

2042
01:18:53,810 --> 01:18:52,080
know if it's alien or this or that but

2043
01:18:55,550 --> 01:18:53,820
what they do know are the facts that

2044
01:18:58,010 --> 01:18:55,560
this happened this was reported these

2045
01:18:59,450 --> 01:18:58,020
people say this you know and you can

2046
01:19:01,010 --> 01:18:59,460
catch the patterns around the country

2047
01:19:02,510 --> 01:19:01,020
with the nuclear stuff catch the

2048
01:19:05,209 --> 01:19:02,520
patterns at all the different facilities

2049
01:19:06,950 --> 01:19:05,219
it's documented within Project Blue Book

2050
01:19:09,169 --> 01:19:06,960
you can look at the documents in the

2051
01:19:12,350 --> 01:19:09,179
archives you know so all that is there

2052
01:19:13,669 --> 01:19:12,360
and factual to really speak to the fact

2053
01:19:17,330 --> 01:19:13,679
that something

2054
01:19:18,950 --> 01:19:17,340
is happening yeah and and and yeah and I

2055
01:19:21,110 --> 01:19:18,960
I do I mean I think the fundamental

2056
01:19:23,870 --> 01:19:21,120
things you know just like for me is like

2057
01:19:25,610 --> 01:19:23,880
you know that again that you are dealing

2058
01:19:28,790 --> 01:19:25,620
with intelligently controlled Vehicles

2059
01:19:30,770 --> 01:19:28,800
here and that are not you know an earth

2060
01:19:33,229 --> 01:19:30,780
Nation operating them

2061
01:19:35,030 --> 01:19:33,239
um in this Exquisite limited case pool

2062
01:19:37,070 --> 01:19:35,040
that has been going on at least since

2063
01:19:38,810 --> 01:19:37,080
you know the 40s that there is a nuclear

2064
01:19:41,630 --> 01:19:38,820
connection

2065
01:19:42,770 --> 01:19:41,640
um that it is intelligently controlled

2066
01:19:44,209 --> 01:19:42,780
right when you talk to some of the

2067
01:19:46,669 --> 01:19:44,219
people you know who are not out in the

2068
01:19:48,410 --> 01:19:46,679
public and they will describe how these

2069
01:19:50,149 --> 01:19:48,420
things react to difference you know so I

2070
01:19:52,669 --> 01:19:50,159
talked a little bit about earlier senses

2071
01:19:55,010 --> 01:19:52,679
or maneuvering against them or you know

2072
01:19:56,870 --> 01:19:55,020
that there's and how they will approach

2073
01:20:00,709 --> 01:19:56,880
some pop out of nowhere you know that's

2074
01:20:03,649 --> 01:20:00,719
almost messaging uh a gaming element

2075
01:20:05,330 --> 01:20:03,659
um you know like so there's you know but

2076
01:20:08,510 --> 01:20:05,340
that stuff is fascinating

2077
01:20:09,410 --> 01:20:08,520
um and you know at a minimum worthy of

2078
01:20:12,470 --> 01:20:09,420
um

2079
01:20:15,530 --> 01:20:12,480
I think attention yeah more than a

2080
01:20:21,550 --> 01:20:19,370
all three of us for sure absolutely well

2081
01:20:23,930 --> 01:20:21,560
thank you so much for your time

2082
01:20:27,290 --> 01:20:23,940
absolutely amazing and really wonderful

2083
01:20:28,430 --> 01:20:27,300
to be able to pick your brain and have a

2084
01:20:30,410 --> 01:20:28,440
nice back and forth today it's

2085
01:20:31,790 --> 01:20:30,420
absolutely fantastic no and this is

2086
01:20:33,770 --> 01:20:31,800
great as well and I you know I I

2087
01:20:36,050 --> 01:20:33,780
appreciate how

2088
01:20:39,229 --> 01:20:36,060
um you know you guys obviously you know

2089
01:20:40,790 --> 01:20:39,239
uh I'll watch the you know the show

2090
01:20:42,770 --> 01:20:40,800
before we were talking about my drone

2091
01:20:44,330 --> 01:20:42,780
article and you know obviously this is

2092
01:20:46,970 --> 01:20:44,340
the great thing is the passion in the

2093
01:20:48,290 --> 01:20:46,980
subject and you know really

2094
01:20:49,850 --> 01:20:48,300
um you know obviously there are some

2095
01:20:51,410 --> 01:20:49,860
kooky people interested in it which is

2096
01:20:53,149 --> 01:20:51,420
fine but they're also you know a lot of

2097
01:20:55,189 --> 01:20:53,159
just normal people right who are like

2098
01:20:57,649 --> 01:20:55,199
for whatever reason

2099
01:20:59,750 --> 01:20:57,659
um you know push through the stigma I

2100
01:21:01,430 --> 01:20:59,760
just I I do

2101
01:21:02,390 --> 01:21:01,440
um and and

2102
01:21:05,090 --> 01:21:02,400
um

2103
01:21:07,250 --> 01:21:05,100
you know that that's I think I think the

2104
01:21:08,990 --> 01:21:07,260
next few years are going to be uh

2105
01:21:13,370 --> 01:21:09,000
extremely exciting

2106
01:21:16,070 --> 01:21:13,380
um well it's all up to you so

2107
01:21:19,149 --> 01:21:16,080
it's up to all of us up to all of us

2108
01:21:23,090 --> 01:21:22,010
look forward to it uh hopefully we can

2109
01:21:25,729 --> 01:21:23,100
do it again and good luck with

2110
01:21:27,770 --> 01:21:25,739
everything sir you too keep up the good

2111
01:21:29,689 --> 01:21:27,780
work all right thanks though thank you

2112
01:21:31,189 --> 01:21:29,699
so much Tom

2113
01:21:34,130 --> 01:21:31,199
wonderful talk

2114
01:21:36,830 --> 01:21:34,140
absolutely great yeah yeah yeah really

2115
01:21:41,030 --> 01:21:36,840
really enjoyed that you know time flew

2116
01:21:42,770 --> 01:21:41,040
back time flew by and it's you know I I

2117
01:21:45,050 --> 01:21:42,780
think it's our both of our first time

2118
01:21:48,709 --> 01:21:45,060
really talking speaking with him anyway

2119
01:21:51,050 --> 01:21:48,719
right and I I look forward to I'd

2120
01:21:54,290 --> 01:21:51,060
welcome being able to talk with him more

2121
01:21:56,149 --> 01:21:54,300
in the future as as more uh news and

2122
01:21:59,990 --> 01:21:56,159
more developments come out in the days

2123
01:22:01,910 --> 01:22:00,000
and months ahead for sure for sure

2124
01:22:03,169 --> 01:22:01,920
um yeah that was great loved loved

2125
01:22:05,209 --> 01:22:03,179
talking to him and I know he doesn't do

2126
01:22:07,310 --> 01:22:05,219
this stuff very often so uh it's pretty

2127
01:22:08,750 --> 01:22:07,320
cool that he that he was able to do this

2128
01:22:11,630 --> 01:22:08,760
and we could pick his brain a little bit

2129
01:22:14,330 --> 01:22:11,640
we learned some pretty cool things like

2130
01:22:16,750 --> 01:22:14,340
some possible UAP baiting

2131
01:22:19,130 --> 01:22:16,760
yeah some other interesting things

2132
01:22:22,790 --> 01:22:19,140
absolutely and it's always interesting

2133
01:22:26,510 --> 01:22:22,800
to get a a you know a journalist take on

2134
01:22:28,729 --> 01:22:26,520
on situations like sure like the

2135
01:22:30,709 --> 01:22:28,739
pressures of of balancing National

2136
01:22:33,290 --> 01:22:30,719
Security versus the interests of the

2137
01:22:35,149 --> 01:22:33,300
public Mockingbird anything like that

2138
01:22:37,070 --> 01:22:35,159
and a little background on how they do

2139
01:22:39,770 --> 01:22:37,080
things right like well I'm talking to a

2140
01:22:41,870 --> 01:22:39,780
source that made doesn't even like the

2141
01:22:43,910 --> 01:22:41,880
other source they don't even you know

2142
01:22:45,830 --> 01:22:43,920
but and they're all saying the same

2143
01:22:49,430 --> 01:22:45,840
things like you know that's important

2144
01:22:51,169 --> 01:22:49,440
for the public at large to know that you

2145
01:22:52,970 --> 01:22:51,179
know um journalists aren't just coming

2146
01:22:54,770 --> 01:22:52,980
out there and putting together whatever

2147
01:22:56,630 --> 01:22:54,780
[\h__\h] and ball story they want like

2148
01:22:58,910 --> 01:22:56,640
they're approaching this like they were

2149
01:23:01,070 --> 01:22:58,920
trained to approach things multiple

2150
01:23:02,870 --> 01:23:01,080
sources from different areas they don't

2151
01:23:04,669 --> 01:23:02,880
communicate sometimes don't even like

2152
01:23:06,890 --> 01:23:04,679
each other and he's hearing the same

2153
01:23:09,229 --> 01:23:06,900
things you know so

2154
01:23:11,930 --> 01:23:09,239
that kind of stuff is good to know so

2155
01:23:15,470 --> 01:23:11,940
absolutely 100 we're gonna have Mario

2156
01:23:18,350 --> 01:23:15,480
Woods uh next week oh cool all right

2157
01:23:22,010 --> 01:23:18,360
great yeah well I I will I'm looking

2158
01:23:24,169 --> 01:23:22,020
forward to to coming up with a A list of

2159
01:23:26,689 --> 01:23:24,179
Juicy questions for sergeant Mario

2160
01:23:28,370 --> 01:23:26,699
that's that's fantastic yeah great for

2161
01:23:30,229 --> 01:23:28,380
those who don't know he was at uh

2162
01:23:32,570 --> 01:23:30,239
Ellsworth in the mid 70s had a crazy

2163
01:23:34,370 --> 01:23:32,580
experience

2164
01:23:36,229 --> 01:23:34,380
um at that nuclear base so we're going

2165
01:23:38,870 --> 01:23:36,239
to talk to him next week can't wait for

2166
01:23:40,910 --> 01:23:38,880
that yeah it'll be fun thanks to anybody

2167
01:23:42,709 --> 01:23:40,920
in the chat yeah that's going to be a

2168
01:23:45,649 --> 01:23:42,719
really good follow-up to Tom Rogan this

2169
01:23:49,010 --> 01:23:45,659
week covering covering UFOs and nukes

2170
01:23:51,229 --> 01:23:49,020
right good stuff thanks so much to

2171
01:23:53,209 --> 01:23:51,239
everybody in the chat uh for those that

2172
01:23:55,430 --> 01:23:53,219
weren't here last week didn't join us

2173
01:23:58,130 --> 01:23:55,440
last week happy New Year

2174
01:24:01,070 --> 01:23:58,140
um and uh we're looking forward to a

2175
01:24:03,110 --> 01:24:01,080
great 2023. absolutely

2176
01:24:05,090 --> 01:24:03,120
all right Belle love you man all right

2177
01:24:21,430 --> 01:24:05,100
love you too man I'll see you soon right

2178
01:24:36,669 --> 01:24:24,600
we're going to talk about flying saucers

2179
01:24:41,150 --> 01:24:39,470
flying suckers